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Abstract

Product categories are more than classification devices that organize markets; when reflecting market actors'
purposes, they are also judgment devices. Taking stock of the literature on product categories and drawing
on the distinction between the faculties of knowing and judging, we elaborate a framework that accounts
for how and why market actors include or exclude normative attributes in a product category definition.
Based on a field study of the development of Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) funds in France, we
describe the phases and conditions of a judgment framework for category definition, for both established
and nascent categories. We discuss implications for research on product categories and the workings of
markets more broadly.
Key words: Categories –– Purpose — Norms –– Morals –– Markets –– Investment Industry –– Socially
Responsible Investment (SRI)
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Since Aristotle, social science has distinguished between knowing and judging, and the corresponding
faculties synthesized by Kant (1790). Whereas knowing activates the cognitive capacities of agents and
audiences in accordance with their individual and collective representations of what is, judging engages a
relationship between actors’ values and what, in actuality, a category represents and should accomplish
with regards to a purpose. Judging implies that actors refer a priori to the values they imbue the category
with. Extant research on market categories has produced a vast array of findings about the antecedents
and consequences of both categorical membership and violations, relying on the assumption that market
actors know, recognize, and make sense of categorical features and cues (Durand and Paolella 2013, Hsu
et al. 2009, Hsu and Grodal 2015, Phillips et al. 2013). While past studies focused on market actors’ faculty
of knowing (categories and their positive attributes), this study explores product categories as a function of
market actors’ faculty of judging (categories and their normative attributes). This change in perspective raises
questions on two accounts. First, while most of extant research characterizes evaluation of categories, few
help us understand the normative constitution of product categories, in particular the infusion of
normative attributes in existing categories. Second, while many studies document the elaboration and
institutionalization of value-laden categories in specific industries (Lounsbury and Rao 2004, Ozcan and
Gurses 2017, Weber et al. 2008), there is a need for a general framework accounting for not only
inclusion but also silencing normative attributes in product categories.
Taking stock of previous research streams in product category, and social and moral underpinnings of
markets, we explore the processes and conditions under which market actors—particularly producers—
come to include normative attributes in the definition of a product category. Here, we define normative
attributes as characteristics that reveal a purpose or specific values stemming from and referring to the
faculty of judging. Normative attributes differ fundamentally from positive attributes (i.e. physical and
functional features), as they engage different brain functions, mobilize diverse languages and narratives,
and reveal the impossibility of compensatory trade-offs among features. Studying these differences entails
analyzing how the faculty of judging is revealed in the definition of a product category, and how changes
in attributes represent the expression of normative modifications. Unravelling how producers infuse (or
withdraw) a sense of purpose (Hollensbe et al. 2014) into (or from) a product category’s definition
contributes to elucidate why and how market actors orient the workings and normative content of
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markets more broadly (Durand and Thornton 2018, Fourcade et al. 2013, Fourcade and Healy 2007).
Empirically, we study the definition of the Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) mutual fund product
category in the investment industry in France from 1997 to 2017. We use a field inductive analytical
approach (Chiles et al. 2004, Davis and Marquis 2005) based on eleven years of participant observation in
the industry (2006–2017), 98 semi-structured interviews, and secondary evidence. SRI funds differ from
conventional funds by taking into account not only financial criteria but also environmental, social, and
governance (ESG) criteria. ESG criteria may include, for example, screening for carbon dioxide (CO2)
emission levels or human rights violations. In 2015, worldwide investments in SRI funds totaled €12
trillion, comprising approximately 12% of all traded assets globally, but representing 25% of the assets
under management (AUM) in France (Novethic 2015). The same year, the French investment industry, in
accordance with the French public authorities, was the first in the world to define the SRI category based
on the moral purposes of the product, not its technical features (Sapin 2015).
From our analysis of this setting, we derive what we call “a judgment framework of product category
definition.” We divide this framework into two stable phases (“silencing” and “including normative
attributes”) separated by an intermediate phase of turmoil (“questioning normative attributes”) and four
possible paths connecting these phases. This general framework addresses the processes and conditions
by which normative attributes are included or excluded from definitions of product categories, for both
already established and nascent categories. In explaining how and why market actors come to include
normative attributes in their definition of products, we substantiate that product categories constitute
more than the cognitive infrastructures of markets—that is, they involve more than simply the faculty of
knowing. Categories also include normative attributes that comprise values and intentionality, although
the latter are most often silenced. Product categories hence are not only organizing devices but also
function as questioning devices that encourage market actors to reflect on their purposes when producing
or buying a specific product. Unravelling the judgmental nature of product categories not only offers
novel ways of apprehending those devices for category scholars, it also provides researchers willing to
uncover the social and moral foundations of markets with new modes of instantiation and transformation
of established practices. Through this contribution, we hope to open new research avenues in how
organizations, human beings, and their respective purposes intertwine with the infrastructures of markets
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– a topic increasingly important as normative issues in both markets and societies are becoming of
primary concern.

Including Normative Attributes in a Product Category Definition
Beyond Product Categories as Cognitive Devices
Researchers have studied the conditions under which the attributes of product categories reduce
ambiguity, facilitate identification, and lead to superior outcomes in market exchanges (Granqvist et al.
2013, Hannan et al. 2007, Hsu et al. 2009, Paolella and Durand 2016). To yield ecological advantages (e.g.,
increased selection by audiences, higher prices, higher valuation, better margins) and to operate smoothly,
nothing in a category must hinder an actor’s faculty of knowing. Hence, product categories should
conform either to prototypes (Hsu et al. 2009) or to audience members’ theories of value (Kodeih et al.
2018, Paolella and Durand 2016, Zuckerman 2017). Thus, if product categories are to serve as cognitive
interfaces that simplify complex realities, they should not be evolving, complicated, ambiguous, or impure
(Hannan et al. 2007, Lounsbury and Rao 2004). For example, when producers span categories, they mix
signals and obscure the faculty of knowing what is being offered, thereby complicating the cognitive
processes of identification and evaluation (Durand and Boulongne 2017). Audiences tend to sanction
producers, conditional on whether there are guarantees of quality (e.g., the high status of the producer),
environmental characteristics that make the spanning innocuous (e.g., little contrast between categories),
or audiences are able to value diversity and recombine attributes in a more satisfying ensemble (for
reviews, see Durand and Paolella 2013, Vergne and Wry 2014). While these findings are coherent and
cumulative, they ignore a fundamental aspect of categories in markets: that audiences may consider them
as a priori appropriate, moral, or beautiful; i.e., market actors not only know about and recognize
categories’ attributes but also judge them.
This distinction between knowing and judging echoes Kant (1790), who divided the critique of
judgment into the critiques of aesthetic and teleological judgments. In his critique of teleological
judgment, Kant discerned our ability to know what is—the faculty of understanding, which associates an
a posteriori phenomenon as a specimen of existing universal principles expressed through concepts—from
our ability to desire—the faculty of reason, which defines a priori why observable reality should be in a
certain way. The faculty of reason is associated with freedom rather than with knowledge.
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By analogy, while prior works emphasized knowledge of and about product categories, we explore the
role of categories beside and beyond the faculty of knowing. In markets, certain categories respond to our
faculty of judging—i.e., our a priori desire for some ideals, such as doing good by consuming for some or
combating the political correctness associated with global warming for others. To clarify and sharpen our
point, we rely on Kant’s well-known critique and distinction among faculties that has underlied many
philosophical discussions about objective versus constructed realities over the past centuries. Hence, we
distinguish between the faculty of knowing that consists of assessing a product based on its positive attributes
and the faculty of judging that implies projecting ideals onto the product category and assessing it based on
normative attributes. A product category actually assembles its definition by incorporating positive
attributes recognized by the faculty of knowing 1—i.e. physical and functional features easily measurable
and commensurable —and attributes that we refer to as normative because they point to purposes and
values. Those attributes are per se less measurable, less factual, and less commensurable, thereby activating
the audiences’ faculty of judging an attribute’s goodness or inappropriateness. 2
Our setting’s normative attributes refer mostly to morals: Is there a right (or wrong) way to invest? If
so, how do we define a socially responsible investment product? Morals embody humans’ highest goals
and aspirations, and define what is deemed appropriate (Anteby 2013). However, as formulated by Kant
(1790), from whom we borrowed the separation between the faculties of knowing and judging, normative
judgments populate a spectrum from aesthetic to teleological judgment. Schematically, these multiple
normative judgments can be represented on a normative map with the following two axes: (1) normative
constitution toward normative evaluation, and (2) idea/general toward sensation/particular. Regarding

Note that positive attributes can be the outcomes of normative discussions (see Khaire and Wadhwani 2010, Lee
et al. 2017, Weber et al. 2008).
2
Attributes referring to social and environmental dimensions (e.g. green products or Fair trade) are often perceived
as “normative.” It is not necessarily the case in our approach. In our definition, what matters is the type of faculty
mobilized by the attribute – the faculty of knowing for positive attributes and the faculty of judging for normative
ones. Thus being “energy efficient” does not necessarily imply the faculty of judging, if the agreement upon the
quantity of carbon emissions associated with efficiency does not spur any question regarding the goodness or
inappropriateness of the qualification. In contrast, due to their unique qualities and the individual experience they
involve, ideal and sensational features always require the faculty of judging, and are therefore characterized as
normative attributes in our framework. Likewise, we envision all the purposes of a product as normative attributes,
even if those appear to be functional or physical. For instance, promising ‘value-for-money’ i.e. important salary
increases after an MBA appears objective, measurable, and is a function of such a program; however, it is clearly not
value-neutral as conveying a certain social vision that associates closely human and market values.
1
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the first axis, most of the prior research that studied normative aspects of market categories has dealt with
normative evaluation. For instance, assessing the authenticity or a good taste of a product implies that the
prototype of the category has already been acknowledged and agreed on—at least temporarily (Goldberg
et al. 2016). In the case of Italian wines, producers attribute the label Barolo or Barbaresco depending on
the interpretation of wine’s mode of production (Negro et al. 2011, p. 1452). By contrast, our
investigation concerns the normative constitution of the category. Meanwhile, the second axis extends
from sensation/particular to idea/general. A vast majority of prior research on categories dealt with
cultural and identitary products (e.g. cuisine, wine, and film). As such, these product categories relate to
more particular and corporeal impressions, and hence belong more to the sensation/particular extreme
associated with gustative pleasure, beauty, and aesthetics. By contrast, our study focuses on the other
extreme, principles and morals (e.g., loyalty and betrayal (Phillips et al. 2013)) which involve higher-level
considerations, associated with ideal(ized) characteristics that have universal reach. Our inquiry is
therefore situated at the intersection of normative constitution (hence upstream of normative evaluation)
and idea/general, but has implications for all types of normative situations, as we will discuss later.
Specificities of Normative Attributes
When a product category contains normative attributes, the cognitive mechanisms involved in the faculty
of knowing prove insufficient. Normative attributes in a category definition place an evaluator in a
judgment position rather than a knowledge position. A product offering no longer corresponds with
information stored in people’s memories (Hannan et al. 2007) or information that needs to be
recombined ad hoc when making a purchase decision (Durand and Paolella 2013). Rather, market actors
project potential consequences, switching the stance from “is” and “is not” to “could,” “should,” and
“ought to be.” For instance, in their study of the early thrift industry in the United States (i.e., mutual selfhelp organizations that first appeared in the 1830s and functioned as saving and loans companies that
specialized in real estate loans), Haveman and Rao (1997, pp. 1611–1612) showed that organizers
reflected on “what thrift is (not) and what thrift should (not) do” mobilizing “theories of moral
sentiment” (Smith 1759) when creating their systems of loans—e.g., “to make good citizens”, “to make
happy homes, contented communities, a prosperous nation.”
In such cases, evidence exists that apparently simple decisions, such as fixing a price, can take a long
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time. For instance, stakeholders inside fair-trade organizations struggled to agree on a “fair” price for
producers (Reinecke and Ansari 2015, p. 867). Organizational members ended up having to implement an
“ethics as sensemaking” method to reconcile differing views of what constitutes a “fair” price. Similarly,
Quattrone (2015) described how the Jesuit Order developed a procedural approach to morals to provide
its members with concrete ways to both deal with situations in a case-by-case mode and live their faith as
an “unfolding rationality.” Due to their inherent difficulties, not evoking normative issues is a common
way to overcome the difficulties tied to those attributes. For instance, Anteby (2013) explained how the
Harvard Business School developed a shared understanding among faculty of what was deemed good or
bad through what he called “vocal silence.” Despite the absence of any specific guidance, vocal silence
shaped behavior and sustained the morals of the organization over time by embedding them in the
routines of the organization by supporting a “deeper metaethical rejection of fixed or objective morals”
(Anteby and Anderson 2016, p. 389, see also Ho 2009, Jackall 1988). Those difficulties apply to
sensational features as well. Experential goods such as wine (Negro et al. 2011), classical music (Glynn
and Lounsbury 2005), fine dining (Rao et al. 2003) or art (DiMaggio 1987) all require individuals to make
difficult and personal aesthetic, gustative and emotional judgments that render the workings of such
markets particularly complex (Massa et al. 2017, Voronov et al. 2013).
For an organization, the challenges of including normative attributes in the definition of a product
category are several. As illustrated by the above studies, normative attributes do not appeal to the same
cognitive processes as those sparked by positive attributes. First, normative attributes imply that
individuals activate a judgment in an effort to appreciate what the producer’s intentionality is and should
be. For instance, during the creation of the market for grass-fed meat and dairy products, market actors
first had to base their decisions on intuitive emotional reactions—“gut feeling” (Weber et al. 2008, p.
559). Studies in cognitive science concur that the brain areas activated in each decision-making process
differ greatly (Greene and Haidt 2002). Individuals who face moral dilemmas activate regions of the
brains linked to emotions and affect that are not triggered when processing other information (Greene et
al. 2001, Moll and de Oliveira-Souza 2007).
Second, while positive attributes are highly salient and expressed in a language and metrics easily
accessible to our faculty of knowing, normative attributes require different narratives and explanations.

7

Normative characteristics such as carbon-neutral production, promoting beauty, and transmitting legacy
do not benefit from the kind of language and metrics often agreed upon beforehand for positive
attributes. For instance, Huault and Rainelli-Weiss (2011) documented how the financial market for
weather derivatives failed to develop due to proponents’ inability to translate weather risks into positive
(financial) terms, as market actors categorized divergently what the market should be. The same
difficulties apply to markets of singularities, such as artworks or luxury products, for which judgment
devices, such as appellations, critics, guides or rankings, are necessary for consumers to make decisions
(Karpik 2010, p. 45–46).
Third, normative attributes slow down the work of identification and evaluation (Murphy 2002).
Whereas positive attributes may lead to computational difficulties in terms of combining factors and
rank-ordering attributes to maximize one’s utility (Barsalou 1991, Durand and Boulongne 2017), they do
not entail major problems that substitution rules cannot satisfy. The choice comes down to an arbitrage
among preference criteria. However, when normative attributes are added to positive attributes, the utility
equation becomes too complex, and for more extreme normative attributes such as morals, no real
compensatory trade-off is possible (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006). The cost associated with a normative
violation (e.g., lying about authenticity) is not just economic but pertains to a different regime of
justification. For instance, beyond its risk/return performance, a “green” investment product that
comprises stocks of “brown” companies may deceive and hurt a client’s trust for her bank.
Taking Stock of Previous Works and Raising New Questions
A first stream of research on categories that we referred to previously has centered its attention on the
evaluative consequences of category membership when category definitions have stabilized (Hsu et al.
2009, Paolella and Durand 2016). A second stream of research has focused on the processes, practices,
and tactics explaining why certain groups come to impose their definition of product categories (Lee et al.
2017, Ozcan and Gurses 2017, Weber et al. 2008). For this stream of research, the emergence and
creation of categories stem from rhetorical and power struggles where values and interests confront each
other.
As such, Khaire and Wadhwani (2010) described in great detail the formation of the Indian modern
art market. They showed that art historians and critics redefined the meanings associated with 20 th-
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century Indian art from “provincial” and “decorative” to a “variety of modernism” (p. 1282). Market
actors introduced criteria for judging Indian artists and their works based on the evaluative constructs
used to assess the work of Western modern artists. By agreeing on the “definitional antecedents of value”
(p. 1296), these actors enabled Indian modern art to become a stand-alone category with common
evaluation criteria that could be used to price the aesthetic value of such goods.
Weber, Heinze, and DeSoucey (2008) studied the formation of the U.S. market for grass-fed meat and
dairy products. The authors showed that social movements mobilized a set of cultural codes, enabling the
creation of the market. These codes were constituted by binary oppositions, implying a judgment of what
was desirable against what was undesirable: authenticity over manipulation, sustainability over
exploitation, and natural over artificial. The movement used such differences to position grass-fed
products as alternatives to conventional ones. Grass-fed meat and dairy products were thus not reduced
to their calorie and fat content; rather, they evoked a mission involving values of respect for life and
earth. The authors explained: “These production stories are self-enhancing for consumers who can
associate themselves with these moralities through the act of consumption.” (Weber et al. 2008, p. 555)
Likewise, Lee, Hiatt, and Lounsbury (2017) demonstrated how California Certified Organic Farmers
(CCOF), the standards organization for California’s organic food, used different legitimation strategies to
transform the meaning of organic food and thereby support the growth of the market. The CCOF’s
strategies included the implementation of standardized and rationalized procedures and practices to
loosen the original constraints on organic farming, such as authorizing the use of sodium nitrate. These
decisions contradicted the personal values and ideals of the pioneering members of the CCOF but
enabled the codification of product inputs and the professionalization of the organization.
Thus, some studies pointed to the role of normative attributes in the definition and shaping of
product categories. Likewise, scholars interested in social entrepreneurship (Battilana and Dorado 2010,
Dacin et al. 2011) and social movement approaches to markets (De Bakker et al. 2013, Durand and
Georgallis 2018, Haveman and Rao 1997, Lounsbury 2001) investigated the processes through which
individuals imbue market practices with specific values. However, these studies do not offer a general
framework for how normative attributes become included or excluded from a category definition but
rather specific characterization of particular cases.
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Most research also tends to ignore how the faculty of judging still matters after a category has been
established. For instance, once market actors agreed on the criteria for judging Indian modern art, they
stopped evoking the meanings associated with the category. Value-laden products such as organic food
do not seem to invoke normative attributes in the definition of the product either. In their study of grassfed meat and dairy products, Weber et al. (2008) explained that brokers translated the cultural codes into
action frames and language that consumers could understand (e.g., eating authentic, nutritious food),
which relegated to secondary importance farmers’ moral struggle against conventional agricultural
practices. Morality was expressed through stories and imagery—“marketing materials” targeted at “less
ideologically committed consumers.” (Weber et al. 2008, p. 555–556) Similarly, Lee, Hiatt, and Lounsbury
(2017) showed that the shift from producer to product attributes during the standardization of U.S.
organic food products led to the disappearance of pioneers’ values from the product category. According
to existing literature, hence, an agreement on the definition of a product category, necessarily comes at
the expense of the maintenance of values and ideals. Therefore, when scholars mention the role of norms
and intentions in category product definitions, they typically treat the period of debate over category
attributes as a transitional phase on the road to stability and conformity in a market (Durand and Khaire
2017, Hannan et al. 2007, Suarez et al. 2015). As Schneiberg and Berk (2010, p. 258) put it: “once
categories are in place, all the politics, debates, struggles to come to terms with novelty, all the work of
category revision, experimentation, and redefinition cease, recede from view, becoming buried in the
archives, day to day practices, or architectures of markets (Lounsbury and Rao 2004, p. 974).”
However, as illustrated by the 2008 financial crisis (MacKenzie 2011), shifting sentiments about
nuclear energy (Garud et al. 2010), and the internationalization of digital services such as Uber and
Bitcoin (Vergne and Swain 2017), product category attributes are neither totally static nor totally positive;
rather, to different degrees, they can engage our faculty of judging a priori how and what observable reality
should be. For instance, while songs and films belong to genres comprising a well-codified categorical
system (Hsu 2006), many tunes and films comprise content that appeals to our faculty of judging, not to
our faculty of knowing. Likewise, while law practices are well codified, the addition of separate practices
can hurt clients’ moral feelings and jeopardize trust (Phillips et al. 2013).
Therefore, at their origin, positive attributes may have been shaped by normative conditions and
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arguments about what is “good” versus “evil” or what is “ugly” versus “beautiful.” While the definition
of a product category could result from oppositions between norms, values, and morals, most papers
concede that these debates and fights all recede when products compete on markets: economic
comparison relies on positive attributes and commensuration across attributes (Espeland and Stevens
1998, Hannan et al. 2007, Zuckerman 2017). Hence, extant streams of research tend to acknowledge that
to be effective, a product category definition needs to evoke attributes that are positive—i.e. well-defined,
measurable, observable, and comparable—and study the inclusion and exclusion processes of normative
attributes in the definitions of product categories mainly as objects of historical interest.
We aim to complement these research streams about product categories and the moral and social
underpinnings of market exchanges with another that acknowledges that, aside from the faculty of
knowing what a category is, audiences may desire to confront themselves with categories as they ought to
be, thereby invoking a different faculty: the faculty of judging. We elaborate our questioning around the
distinction between the faculty of knowing and faculty of judging, and offer a generic framework of the
processes and conditions by which product categories come to include or not include normative
attributes in their definition, whether in already established or nascent categories.

Methods: A Longitudinal Field Study
Research Setting
We study Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) funds, which comprise a significant proportion of the
French mutual fund market. A mutual fund is an investment vehicle that pools funds from retail and/or
institutional investors and is professionally managed by investment managers to produce capital growth
and income. In 2013, the investment industry worldwide was estimated to manage $100 trillion in assets
under management (AUM), the equivalent of one year of global gross domestic product (Lund et al. 2013,
TheCityUK 2014), and was expected to hit $145 trillion by 2025 (Benjamin 2017). In 2015, Europe, with
31% of global AUM, ranked as the second-largest investment market after the United States (at 49% of
global AUM) (International Monetary Fund 2015). France accounted for 19% of the European market,
ranking between the United Kingdom at 35% and Germany at 10% (European Fund and Asset
Management Association 2015). In 2014, 18% of conventional funds managed in France systematically
integrated environmental, social, and governance (ESG) criteria into their investment processes (known
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as ESG integration), and SRI funds represented an additional 7% of total AUM (Novethic 2015), mainly
among institutional investors (see Figure 1). This means that debates regarding the product category
definition of SRI funds directly concerned at least 25% of French AUM, or approximately $1.5 trillion.
Insert Figure 1
SRI can be qualified as an “extreme setting” (Weber et al. 2008), in the sense that it comprises two
elements—finance and morals—usually perceived as opposites (Haveman and Rao 1997, Yan et al. 2018).
Unconventional settings can be theoretically ground-breaking since they provide the opportunity to look
at phenomena with a new lens, thereby questioning previous understandings (Bamberger and Pratt 2010).
Analysis of such settings pushes theories to their boundaries, thereby strengthening their validity. This
setting is particularly appropriate for our research goal since it helps us understand how normative
attributes (such as morals) can be included in product categories whose features are perceived to be
positive (such as in a mutual fund). Note that unlike other national SRI movements, French SRI did not
comprise any normative attribute when it was first created, moral concerns appearing only in the
aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, as we will explain below.
Data Sources
We used an inductive field analytic method that involves tracking changes over time in a particular field
(Lounsbury et al. 2003) and follow Davis and Marquis’s (2005) problem-driven research approach. Our
research is therefore not a retrospective rationalization of a phenomemon as with many cases; instead, we
accompanied the unfolding of events, unaware of what the outcome would be. Over an eleven-year
period (2006-2017), we collected data from four main sources—interviews, observation, documents and
other secondary data.

Interviews. In total, we interviewed 98 informants during 96 group and individual interview sessions
throughout the study period: 33 from 2006 to 2009, 36 from 2010 to 2014 and 27 from 2015 to 2017.
Interviewees included investment managers; representatives of asset owners (banks, insurance companies,
and retirement funds); trade unions; public authorities; brokers; social rating agencies; professional
associations; SRI lobbies; non-governmental organizations (NGOs); certification bodies and civil society;
and potential users of the SRI label (see Appendix 1 for further details).

Observations. There were two periods of observation. The first one coincided with an ethnography of a
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French asset management company conducted by the first author for her doctoral work, during which
she attended approximately 40 formal events per year (2006–2009). This period of observation was
intense and was documented in a diary on a daily basis. During the second period of observation (2010–
2017), both authors attended five to six professional meetings per year during which they engaged in
informal exchanges with many participants. Finally, in 2015, the first author participated in private
meetings between the French professional association of asset management (Association Française de la
Gestion Financière, or AFG) and the Ministry for the Economy and Finance, during which the two
parties discussed the specifications of the state-backed SRI label.

Documents and secondary data . To complement these data, we performed a content analysis of all
SRI-related articles published in French newspapers from 2007 to 2017. We also analyzed all the
television reports, radio broadcasts, documentaries, blogs, Twitter accounts, and industry reports we
could find on the ongoing debate surrounding the meaning of SRI. Over time, we also secured access to
the working versions and the final version of the state-backed SRI label project and the report of the
French financial markets regulator (Autorité des marchés financiers, or AMF) on SRI. Finally, we
accessed Novethic’s database, which includes a systematic analysis of the composition and number of
self-identified French SRI funds since 2004.
Analytic Process
Analyzing the data involved the sequence of sense-making strategies called grounding, organizing, and
replicating (Langley 1999), as used by Chiles, Meyer, and Hench (2004).
We adopted grounding strategies to induce new theoretical insights from both field data and theory. First,
we used focused coding to identify relevant emerging codes (Charmaz and Belgrave 2002)—that is, terms
consistent with the meanings and words of the respondents. As these categories emerged, we began
comparing our data-driven conceptual framework with the literature on product categories. In particular,
we wondered why it was so difficult for the industry to agree on a common definition and whether
something in our study differed from the literature—an approach known as pattern matching (Yin 2013).
We realized at this point that most of the problems discussed by our interviewees related to
intentionality and morals. We then refined our data structure around the specific issues faced by the
industry and performed axial coding (Strauss and Corbin 1998) by searching for relationships between and
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among these first-order codes and grouping them into second-order codes. For example, actors referred
to contradictory goals inside the investment industry with regard to SRI funds (e.g., whether to develop a
specific market, or alternatively influence conventional funds). We grouped these codes under the
second-order code “moral dimension of the product category.” We then collapsed all of our second-order
codes into two aggregate constructs, “sources of struggles around the definition of the product category”
and “the need to redefine the product category.” Using this data structure (see Figure 2), we focused our
analysis on the relationships between normative attributes (i.e. morals) and product categories, both
theoretically and empirically.
Insert Figure 2
We used organizing strategies to describe the process data in a systematic fashion (Langley 1999). Using
the multiple data sources available, we established a field-level narrative account that chronicled the main
critical events influencing the process definition of SRI. When working on the timeline, we observed,
over time, variations in the responses to the problems identified in the data structure (i.e., the inclusion of
moral attributes in the category). We then used temporal bracketing techniques (Langley 1999) to decompose
processes into successive eras separated by discontinuities to determine whether theorized processes were
replicated across eras (Chiles et al. 2004). We divided the definition process of the SRI product category
into the following three eras (see Figure 3):
(1) Judgment silence (until 2007), the period during which the overall industry actors purposefully
avoided discussions on the normative attributes of SRI funds.
(2) Judgment questioning (2008–2012), the period coinciding with the financial crisis sparking
criticisms of the moral soundness of the SRI product category.
(3) Judgment inclusion (2013–2017), the period during which a common definition of the SRI
product category acknowledged some normative attributes.
Insert Figure 3
Replicating strategies are techniques for “decomposing the data for the replication of theoretical
propositions by phase, by event, and by case” (Langley 1999, p. 707). Once we identified these three eras,
we divided the data structure (see Figure 2) into three substructures, one for each era. In doing so, we
realized that we could compare the industry’s approach on three dimensions: (1) the definition of the
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product category and the presence of normative attributes, (2) the evaluation criteria, and (3) the form of
stakeholder engagement. We then reorganized our data analysis according to the three phases and three
elements, which led to the structure of the findings presented below.
We triangulated among the sources of data and engaged in cross-temporal analysis, comparing
individuals’ recollections of past events to the real-time accounts of these events obtained through the
different phases of interviews and documentary evidence. We also verified our findings in 2016 and 2018
by sending previous versions of this article to key informants and asking them to provide us with critical
feedback. We received only affirmative comments.

The Inclusion of Normative Attributes in the French SRI Product Category
In this section, we present the three core elements for each phase (judgment silence, judgment
questioning, and judgment inclusion), and note whether normative attributes applied. Further details
about the various definitions implemented over the years are available in Appendix 2. We position our
analyses at the level of the producers (i.e., investment managers).
Phase 1. Stability: Judgment Silence (1997–2007)

Category Definition: Lenient. Unlike Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon funds, which were created by
“ethical investors,” French SRI funds were launched by traditional investment managers (Louche and
Lydenberg 2006). The asset management subsidiary of one of the largest French mutual insurance
companies created the first national SRI fund in 1997. Although the subsidiary was motivated by social
concerns (the parent company belonged to the social economy sector, which put public interest before
profits), the SRI fund did not mention any form of morals. By the beginning of the 2000s, a dozen asset
management companies had proposed similar SRI funds. The motivations of these investment managers
were neither religious (such as in the case of Islamic, Methodist, and Quaker funds) nor societal (such as
when Norway’s Global Government Pension Fund aimed to preserve national resources for future
generations of citizens).
French SRI pioneers hoped to render the financial markets more socially responsible and long-term
oriented. To convince other investment managers to also adopt SRI funds, they decided to avoid any
reference to moral judgment and instead argued that the integration of non-financial criteria (e.g., the
level of carbon emissions) would lead to a more holistic view of a fund, and thereby generate both greater
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investment and better financial performance (Arjaliès 2010, Gond and Boxenbaum 2013). Investment
managers willing to raise moral questions were therefore deliberately excluded from industry discussions
(Crifo et al. 2018, Giamporcaro and Gond 2016). Through their coercive power, SRI pionners thus
imposed their moral silence to the industry (Anteby 2013). As a result, the French professional
association of asset management (AFG) defined SRI ambiguously as “integrating non-financial concerns
into investment processes.” This lenient definition of SRI favored the growth of the market by enabling
diverse investment strategies to coexist within an apparently coherent movement (Pontikes 2012).

Evaluation Criteria: Means. To avoid discussing morals that would have sparked difficult questions
about which company was socially responsible or not, most French investment managers adopted a
“best-in-class approach” that entailed selecting the best socially and financially ranked companies in each
sector, regardless of sector content and of firm practices. As long as a mutual fund integrated some nonfinancial criteria, it could name itself SRI. Investment managers judged the best-in-class approach—
maintaining broad portfolio diversification—to be the best method for generating financial performance
while favoring the most socially responsible issuers. This strategy also enabled investment managers
selling SRI funds to avoid normative positions that they perceived to be at odds with the rational and
economic anchorage of the industry: “this is not our job to judge, we are here to manage assets, that’s it.”
(informal discussion with investment managers, 2006) The unique and shallow requirement for
investment managers was to describe their investment process following the guidelines of the 2005
Transparency Code for public SRI funds created by the French professional association of asset
management (AFG) and the French lobby for SRI (Forum pour l’investissement responsable, or
FrenchSIF). To be qualified as SRI, investment managers simply had to prove that they integrated nonfinancial criteria in their investment processes—i.e. only the means mattered. Importantly, the code did
not address the purpose of SRI funds, which could be and was de facto profit maximization.

Stakeholder Engagement: Weak. Investment managers had few reasons to modify their views and
preferences since the industry’s representatives never associated any moral attribute with the SRI
category. Institutional investors, the bulk of SRI funds’ clientele, appreciated the best-in-class approach,
which they viewed as a soft way of both integrating non-financial concerns and pleasing trade unions.
Few retail clients invested their savings in these products, and as such, were neither vocal nor active via
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consumer watchdog associations. NGOs and the media also did not focus their attention on this product
category. The lack of challenge from actors outside investment management leads us to qualify this
period of stakeholder engagement as “weak”—both in terms of practical involvement from stakeholders
and counter-power. This lack of involvement would not last, however.
Phase 2. Turmoil: Judgment Questioning (2008–2012)

Stakeholder Engagement: Confrontational. The global financial crisis that erupted in 2008 caused
many to question the relationship between financial markets and society. As suggested by Hoffman and
Ocasio (2001), some investment managers decided to address the identity challenge raised by the
accusation that banks were responsible for the economic and social damages, and seized this opportunity
to sell SRI funds to retail customers. In September 2010, the French lobby for SRI funds (FrenchSIF or
FIR) organized the first annual national SRI week, and informed the general public about the benefits of
SRI through conferences, press releases, and marketing campaigns. The same week, Friends of the Earth,
one of the world’s leading environmental NGOs, published a press release based on its analysis of the
content of porfolios of all SRI funds that were awarded the Novethic SRI label 3:
SRI investors remain irresponsible....The financial system remains short-term and the search for a
return on investment always higher, at the expense of social and environmental well-being.
Without any real guarantee, and because most of the SRI funds are not substantially different
from other conventional funds, today this label appears to be totally illegitimate. (Louvel and
Rivoalan 2010, p. 17 emphasis in original)
This attack spurred the interest of the media. The NGO was convinced that SRI was a greenwashing
attempt from investment managers in the aftermath of the financial crisis. National newspapers across the
political spectrum published negative articles about SRI, accusing the industry of deceiving its clients. In
2012, a prime-time national TV show, Cash Investigation, dedicated a documentary to malpractices in the
SRI industry, and a scandal erupted. In an epic scene, the star journalist and her camera operator
denounced the “false labels.” On stage in a landmark professional event, the journalist asked: “How can
an SRI fund labeled by Novethic include shares in Transocean, the Swiss firm that was responsible for

Novethic, a non-profit organization funded by the French government, launched a label for SRI funds in 2009 that
required companies to comply with the AFG-FrenchSIF Transparency Code, disclose their investment approaches,
and fully publish their portfolios every six months. This last request was unusual for the industry. Nonetheless, many
asset management companies applied for the Novethic SRI label: in 2009, 31 asset management companies
representing 121 SRI funds and almost half of the market requested the label; ultimately, 92 funds managed by 25
asset management companies obtained it.
3
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the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico?” Investment professionals attempted to
explain the “best-in-class approach,” and eventually lost ground.
Concurrently, some investment managers started to make their voices heard. Recognized financiers
left their banks, and activists echoed their concerns by participating in the public debate through films,
books, and TV shows. In 2012, a well-known former SRI analyst, Gaétan Mortier, who was ranked
among the top 15 SRI analysts worldwide, wrote articles attacking the professional association’s placidity
and investment managers’ business-as-usual practices. He also published a book entitled Ethical Finance: A
Big Misunderstanding, criticizing the approach chosen by the industry. In his multiple press and radio
interviews, the author advocated that:
We should not be afraid of “big words” such as “ethics”…. It means an SRI movement “with
teeth,” for which social rating agencies would produce a corpus of independent analysis on all the
topics said to be sensitive (tax havens, excessive remuneration of top managers, etc.), with a
social prism…rather than a financial prism. (Gaétan Mortier, interview in Libération, 10
September 2012)
Meanwhile, bank employees who sold SRI products found it increasingly difficult to meet the demands of
retail clients. As noted in a 2012 informal exchange with an investment manager:
Clients do not understand that we have to select companies among companies that exist. We
cannot invent new companies or lend money to their local butcher. They want to invest in a
mutual fund and then they are disappointed because it is a mutual fund. What can we do?
Triggered by the public debate, politicians also started to express an upsurge in interest in SRI. A
commission responsible for the financial markets created by President Nicolas Sarkozy (2007-2012) thus
questioned the industry about the absence of morals in SRI products. In January 2012, presidential
candidate François Hollande, favored to win the election in April, declared “war” on his “true enemy:”
faceless, unaccountable, and amoral finance (Hollande 2012). For the first time, investment managers had
to confront their stakeholders.

Category Definition: Multiple. In the presence of a lenient category definition and mounting
contestation, actors saw opportunities to segment and recompose the industry (Durand and Khaire 2017,
Hiatt et al. 2009, Pontikes and Barnett 2015). In the aftermath of the scandal, Novethic launched a
stricter SRI label that implied some moral commitment. First, counter to the best-in-class approach,
Novethic enforced the exclusion of harmful companies (e.g., cluster bomb manufacturers). Second, SRI
funds needed to pursue moral goals (i.e., make investments that contribute to a more socially responsible
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economy and society). According to Novethic, the inclusion of non-financial criteria was no longer
sufficient to enable a fund to be labeled SRI. To align its deeds with its mission and to break with its past
practices, Novethic decided to remove investment managers from the committee that awarded its label.
By breaking the judgment silence tacitly chosen by the industry, Novethic spurred a discussion around
the definition of SRI. Some investment managers lauded Novethic’s breakthrough: “They are right; it was
time to kick the anthill over” (Informal discussions with investment managers, 2013). Other investment
managers viewed Novethic as a “betrayer” of the SRI movement, threatening the mainstreaming of SRI,
although only Amundi, the largest asset manager in France and Europe, publicly disagreed with this
moralizing move toward a definition of SRI that was based on portfolio content. The asset management
company officially refused to apply for the new Novethic label and, a few months later, unilaterally
initiated a certification project with AFNOR (Association Française de Normalisation, or French
Association of Normalization), one of the dominant European certification bodies. The Head of SRI
commented:
The evolution of the Novethic label no longer corresponds to our vision of SRI…. SRI is not a
regulated market; it is a sort of R&D for finance. Very selective products, such as our ethical fund
Hymnos, must be able to coexist with SRI products with different—and constraining—demands.
(Amundi, Head of SRI in Les Echos, 8 October 2012)
The AFNOR certification closely resembled Novethic’s prior less stringent label. AFNOR did not
include any moral attribute and focused on the processes of investment, rather than on the content of
portfolios. Amundi expected that the official status of the leading certifying organization would reassure
clients and potentially lead to the formation of an industry standard, which could provide Amundi with a
competitive advantage. As a result, fewer funds applied for the new Novethic label (140 in 2012,
compared with 182 in 2011), due to a self-selection process: Figure 4 shows that the percentage of
rejected applications fell dramatically in the years after the introduction of both new standards, while the
total percentage of accredited funds remained stable (between 30 and 40%).
Insert Figure 4

Evaluation Criteria: Means and Purposes. Novethic’s and Amundi’s attempts to impose their category
standards proved unsatisfactory. Instead of providing a clear definition of SRI, they triggered a
fragmentation of the product category definition and spurred even more societal criticism. The evaluation
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criteria used to judge whether a fund was SRI diverged. The Transparency Code and the AFNOR
certification converged on means: the integration of non-financial criteria into the investment process.
Novethic’s definition comprised a moral purpose: contributing to a better society. Legally, no obligation
existed and any fund could label itself as SRI. To say the least, many clients were confused. Faced with
such difficulties, industry representatives decided it was more prudent not to intervene in the debate: “We
are not here to judge” (Head of SRI Research, AFG, 2010). Reluctant to regulate the industry, they hoped
that competition would solve the issue.
Phase 3. Stability: Judgment Inclusion (2013–2017)

Stakeholder Engagement: Collaborative. Contrary to the hopes of industry representatives, the
controversy did not end. Media interest in the finance industry continued, as did strife among investment
managers around what the media called a “raging war of labels.” In addition, a new law passed (Article
224 of Grenelle II, 2012), aimed at forcing asset management companies to disclose whether they
integrated non-financial criteria. To add to the confusion, the French government officially endorsed the
need for only one industry SRI label (Brovelli et al. 2013). The industry representatives had no choice but
to reconsider their position to restore a form of industry cohesion: “It is time to distinguish between SRI
and conventional funds to maintain a good level of quality among SRI funds…so that they can still play
their role of R&D for the industry” (Responsible for SRI, AFG, 2013).
The professional association launched two working groups: one for investment managers only
(including Amundi) and the other for some investment managers (i.e., not Amundi), SRI lobbies, and
Novethic. After intense discussions from February to July 2013, both groups agreed to move away from
the morally silent SRI definition favored by industry representatives thus far, and to ask the French
authorities to endorse this new approach through a label. In their press release, investment managers
declared that the SRI label had to “insist on the purpose of SRI and its link to sustainable development”
(Association Française de la Gestion Financière and Forum pour l’Investissement Responsable 2013)
In response to the call, the French government created three new working groups: one for investment
managers, one for representatives of civil society, and one for certification bodies. The French
government aimed to address SRI problems through regulation, in an effort to protect the growth of the
investment management industry—a sector judged to be key for France’s economic success. At the same
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time, the government aimed to promote France as a leading market place for “green” investments. To
achieve both objectives, the consultation process was co-led by the Ministry for the Economy and
Finance and the Ministry of Ecology, Sustainable Development, and Energy. Each working group met
regularly from July 2014 to June 2015.
While civil society representatives and certification bodies agreed quickly on some principles,
investment managers were divided. Each investment manager we interviewed had personal opinions, but
only representatives of Amundi and Mirova voiced their concerns publicly. Amundi positioned itself as a
global actor committed to “ESG integration” (taking environmental, social, and governance criteria into
account in all investment decisions by following the “best in class” approach). It navigated among various
national markets and sold both conventional and SRI funds, and hence was highly reluctant to include
moral attributes in the French state-backed SRI label. Mirova, created in 2014 as Natixis’s SRI brand, held
the opposite view: Its SRI funds needed to be as different as possible from conventional SRI funds.
Investment managers at Mirova made it clear that they were there to oppose Amundi and push the entire
industry toward more socially responsible practices.
In December 2014, despite ongoing disputes among investment managers, the French finance
minister, Michel Sapin, declared he wanted an SRI label to be launched: “My goal is clear: to put finance
at the service of the sustainable growth of the real economy, and in a way that financial stability and
protection to savers are maintained.” (Sapin 2014) On September 28, 2015, during the annual national
SRI week, Sapin confirmed the creation of a state-backed SRI label. In France, SRI funds would
distinguish themselves from conventional funds by their purpose: to contribute to a more responsible
economy (Sapin 2015). One year later, the Ministry for the Economy and Finance endorsed the first
industry website created to explain the SRI label to the general public, which included the following
definition:
SRI is a form of investment that aims to reconcile economic performance with social and
environmental impact by financing companies and public organizations that contribute to
sustainable development, whatever their activity sector. The SRI label, attributed through a strict
labeling process led by independent organizations, is a unique milestone for savers who wish to
participate in a more sustainable economy. (Label ISR 2016)
Although tensions remained, these collective attempts to solve the problem led us to describe this
period as collaborative from a stakeholder engagement perspective. To encourage the joint efforts, the
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French government would later appoint both Mirova and Amundi as two of the three asset management
companies on the committee responsible for managing the SRI label.

Category Definition: Purpose-Based. After so many years of controversial debates, industry
representatives came to realize that the definition of a cross-cutting category such as SRI funds brought
their existing category schemes and practices into question. The new purpose-based definition contrasted
vividly with the previous dominant position of investment managers. Indeed, in their press release, the
industry representatives insisted that SRI funds should no longer be judged based only on the means used
by asset management companies (the integration of non-financial criteria into investment processes), but
rather on the purposes they pursued (the development of a socially responsible economy). As noted by the
FrenchSIF president we interviewed in 2013:
We all used to speak about how we constructed SRI funds; we wanted to shift from this
approach because we wanted to speak to the general public. Individuals don’t care about how the
car is working but wonder what it is used for. Then, we thought: We need to define SRI through
the goals it pursues.
In doing so, several investment managers explicitly recognized that the first goal of SRI was not financial,
thereby addressing criticisms and putting an end to the avoidance of normative attributes. NGOs
remained skeptical, but were generally satisfied with this move:
The goal of the campaign is not to shift capitalism, but simply to stop the system from financing
the destruction of the planet. We are not opposed to the world of investment in this campaign.
We want to put a bit of morality in it, clearly. (NGO C specialized in finance, France
Campaigner, 2015)

Evaluation Criteria: Purposes. The state-backed SRI label mentioned the need for SRI funds to both
pursue moral purposes and prove that the pursuit of these purposes was effective. “You can pursue
whatever goals you want, but this should result in better practices, and you have to prove it” (Informal
discussions with investment managers, October 2015). To do so, an SRI fund could choose to: (a)
exclude 20% of companies from the investment universe based on ESG criteria, (b) earn an SRI portfolio
grade significantly above that of the investment universe, or (c) implement an impact assessment measure
that proved the effect of SRI on investment practices (Ministre des Finances et des Comptes Publics
2016). By transforming the moral intentio (Quattrone 2015) of investment managers into a product
category attribute, each asset management company could choose what it judged to be good or bad for
society and the economy: there was no normative agreement ex ante. The means also became of secondary
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importance, providing that SRI funds ultimately sought to contribute to a responsible economy. The SRI
label was expected to spur questions among consumers about their own morals and the expected overall
benefit of SRI for the economy and society.

Judgment Framework of Product Category Definition
Our historical account traces the development of a product category definition, core practices, and
market actors’ positions. We now turn to the conditions that facilitated the transitions from one phase to
the next and suggest the use of more paths in an attempt to constitute a framework for the inclusion or
exclusion of normative attributes in product categories (see Figure 5).
Insert Figure 5
Transition Conditions in the French SRI Case (Judgment Inclusion)
We found two conditions that fostered the transition from judgment silence, a phase of stability, to
judgment questioning, a phase of turmoil in which product attributes are challenged.

Transparency of Means. Investment managers initially attributed the criticisms faced by the industry to
a lack of understanding by external observers who had little financial expertise (hence a poor activation of
the faculty of knowing). They hoped that by better explaining the workings of SRI, they would be able to
educate people and make apparent the merits of the best-in-class approach. As such, they defended the
AFG-FrenchSIF Transparency Code and remained opposed to the idea of an industry SRI label:
“Financial professionals don’t want [a label]. The simplest way to [standardize behavior] is to adopt the
Transparency Code” (Bank C, CSR Deputy Director 2010). Novethic endorsed this transparency
approach in 2009, when creating its first label whose main feature consisted of publishing the content of
all the portfolios that had been awarded the Novethic label.
The transparency of means led to the questioning phase in two ways. First, it provided stakeholders
with access to the practices of investment managers. Because Novethic made all the portfolios available,
Friends of the Earth was able to write its critical report about SRI—a report it had wanted to write for
years but could not for lack of evidence. Likewise, it was the transparency of Amundi and Novethic that
enabled the TV journalist to interview their representatives unprepared, which gave rise to further
criticism.
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Second, the growing transparency of means increased the divide between the industry and its critics.
For years, investment managers resented the media and NGOs’ dispute about the benefits of the best-inclass approach; some described themselves as victims of the “witch hunt” that followed the financial
crisis. By being open about their decision processes, investment managers provided an answer that
appealed to the faculty of knowing to what they perceived to be an ignorance problem about concrete
situations and procedures. The media and NGOs, in contrast, associated the term “socially responsible”
with normative judgments about what was good and bad, not with the adequacy of a technique or a
process. Stakeholders wanted to hear about the “real motivations” of financial actors, not about the
practical details of the investment selection. Investment managers were instead elaborating on the
functional features of the product, in accordance with what the industry described as a “rational” and
“objective” investment practice,4 while critics placed morals and societal questions at the center of their
evaluation. Consequently, the more process-oriented, technical, and transparent the answers of
investment managers were, the more their detractors believed that investment managers refused to
disclose their “true” (financial) motives.

Public and Private Contestation. The ability to publicly and privately contest the lenient definition of
SRI was also key to entering the phase of turmoil. During the phase of moral silence, several investment
managers attempted to criticize the dominant industry practices but were not sufficiently powerful,
organized, or numerous—and were therefore reduced to silence.
The financial crisis catalyzed the attention of many actors (Hoffman and Ocasio 2001), enhanced
public scrutiny, and led to public and private contestation. As demonstrated in the context of scandals,
the conjunction of critical events and publicity whip up criticisms that diffuse broadly (Adut 2005). In the
case of French SRI, journalists, NGOs, and activists brought contestation to the public sphere via the
press and social media. The industry representatives we met with in 2010 confessed that, as shown by the
TV episode of Cash Investigation, they did not know how to handle the (social) media. These interactions
were quite different from the discreet forms of self-regulation they were used to. It was this media game

Note that such qualifications actually convey a specific societal vision of what the purpose of the industry should
be: profit maximizing through the use of calculative devices anchored in economic and financial mathematics (see
Arjaliès et al. 2017, Knorr-Cetina and Preda 2012, Ortiz 2014).
4
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that nevertheless attracted, in turn, the attention of the French government and ushered in the phase of
turmoil.
One of the big issues that industry representatives faced during this period of turmoil was that no
regulation was in place to manage disputes between investment managers. When faced with similar
problems (e.g., regulation), investment managers usually shared a common goal (i.e., market growth),
reached agreement behind closed doors, and then communicated the industry position through a press
release or informal exchanges. Professional meetings on SRI, in contrast, were conflictual and tense. In
cases of disagreement, the professional associations (AFG and FrenchSIF) had no power to enforce any
decision on their investment manager members. After these episodes of contestation, both the
professional association (AFG) and the French lobby for SRI (FrenchSIF) changed their governance
processes and clarified the goals they were pursuing through SRI, notably through a charter that all
members had to sign (FrenchSIF).
By raising their concerns publicly, the media, NGOs, and activists also offered dissident investment
managers an opportunity to voice their concerns. Investment managers were no longer afraid of
questioning the moral silence of the industry—they could use the public contestation to justify their
apprehensions. For instance, some investment managers used Twitter accounts and journalists to advance
their causes—even leaking information to the press during the state-backed SRI labeling process in an
effort to influence the negotiations. Conversations with these investment managers indicated that they
perceived themselves as social activists—and as such they felt closer to some NGOs than to some other
investment managers. This internal contestation meant that moral silence could no longer be maintained.
The professional convention—of maintaining a united front when under attack—cracked, as more
finance professionals themselves experienced the tension between their faculties of knowing and judging.
Therefore, the transparency of means and public and private contestation are the transition conditions
that led to the “judgment questioning” phase. At this point in the process, the inclusion of moral
attributes in the SRI product definition was facilitated by two distinct conditions: identity introspection
and threat to market.

Identity Introspection. Identity introspection corresponds to how individuals experience the moral
tensions revealed by the disconnects between practices, discourses, and product contents. As attacks and
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criticisms against core practices and organizations intensify, organizational members as individuals accept
or oppose blind compliance with organizational rules and principles (Lok 2010) but are constrained by
their organization’s policy. During internal discussions to define SRI, some individuals found themselves
representing multiple identities, blurring the message, and confusing the audience:
The true problem is that we never know in whose name anybody speaks. Is it a personal position,
the industry’s, the company’s?…We have a true problem of governance; we are facing a true
crisis of governance. How should we decide? (Asset Management Company P, CEO 2015)
At an individual level, an investment manager might support a vision of SRI, but her bank might
oppose the definition adopted and the associated rigidity. This situation could lead to identity tensions in
which the product category causes top executives and investment managers to question the meaning of
their occupation, their influence, and freedom (as in Creed et al. 2010). “We are investment managers; we
are here to manage assets but we are also individuals, parents, consumers, etc. We are all of that and this
is not that easy to deal with” (Asset Management Company N, Head of SRI, 2015). On the ground,
financial advisers also found it difficult to understand (and therefore sell) these products. Many could not
answer simple questions. For example:
Last time, a client asked me about this fund. We started looking at the portfolio together, and we
discovered that Total was in it, the French oil major! He told me that this company was not
socially responsible. I agreed with him. What else could I have told him? (Financial Adviser, Bank
F, 2015)
Thus, financial advisers mostly offered conventional funds to retail clients in an attempt to avoid
uncomfortable questions. Likewise, investment managers found it particularly difficult to sell both
conventional and SRI funds. They particularly worried about the cohesiveness of their discourses across
products. On the one hand, greenwashing accusations could threaten asset management companies’
reputations; on the other hand, questions about conventional funds’ societal impacts could provoke
further criticism of these products. These difficulties in selling both conventional and SRI funds led some
investment managers to question the moral grounds of the industry itself. They wondered what the
purpose of their profession was after all:
Are we here to fabricate socially responsible products that will generate better financial performance
in the long term, assuming our responsibility in the markets and driving change towards a
sustainable and fair economy? Or are we just here to do what the clients want, even if this means
harming the planet by continuing to invest in a short-term and narrow manner? (Asset Management
Company P, CEO, 2015)

Threat to Market. This identity introspection led a handful of investment managers to realize that if they
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kept fighting with one another, SRI would certainly vanish. The proponents of ESG integration
(incarnated by Amundi) and those who opposed this best-in-class approach (incarnated by Mirova) were
two sides of the same coin—neither could flourish if SRI was being accused of greenwashing.
Competition needed to occur downstream (after reaching agreement on an SRI definition), not during the
category definition process. Industry representatives and the government also worried about the potential
damage these confusing messages could inflict on the development of the entire industry by weakening
the credibility of investment professionals. Some NGOs and lobbies eventually acknowledged that SRI
was instrumental to the transformation of the financial markets they pursued and should therefore be
protected. Gradually, everybody involved in the discussion started asking the professional associations to
address the problem. Independently and in coordination with the French government, the industry
representatives then opened a multi-party discussion and reconciled in a single definition the contentious
positions taken by different funds, as reflected in Amundi and Mirova’s emblematic positions.
During this process, investment managers reached out to politicians to obtain their support, not for
market deregulation as it was usually the case, but instead to push for a stringent SRI label.
We came and explained to them: You have to increase the regulation on SRI, not weaken it. They
[Ministry for the Economy and Finance] did not understand it, at all. Usually, we do the contrary.
(Informal discussions with three investment managers, 2016)
Investment managers who perceived themselves as social activists hoped to advance their societal
agenda. Investment managers who had no particular societal purpose saw a market opportunity in this
moralization of the industry. In the aftermath of the December 2015 Paris climate conference (at which
195 countries adopted the first-ever universal, although non-binding global climate deal), the French
investment industry could make the most of this SRI label to demonstrate its capacity to deal with any
type of normative issue (e.g. SRI, green or Islamic finance). For governmental authorities, SRI
represented an opportunity to position the country as the world leader in the fight against climate change
and to forge a new relationship between finance and society—a connection that had been broken in the
past decade. In the years following the financial crisis, SRI stood both for the errors of the past and for a
new, better future for the industry.

Framework Extension
Figure 5 offers a judgment framework of the product category definition, or how normative attributes are
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made visible in a product category definition. In the French SRI fund case, the process began and ended
with phases of stability, with a phase of turmoil in between; specific conditions facilitated transitions
between the phases (represented by the solid, downward-facing arrows in Figure 5). Judgment inclusion is
only one of four possible paths. Our model illustrates three other possible trajectories: Judgment
Silencing, Reversion to Silence, and Judgment Maintenance (see Figure 6). In this section, we elaborate on
three other product categories belonging to the finance industry that present similar characteristics with
SRI, yet experienced a different path: Islamic finance, collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), and life
insurance. These cases show how amenable our judgement framework is to extensions that help
acknowledge different paths of inclusion (or not) of normative attributes in product categories (see Figure
6). Transitions conditions are the same leading to the Questioning phase and have been adjusted to lead
to the Silencing phase (vs. to the Inclusion phase): market opportunity (instead of threat to market) and
identity muting (instead of identity introspection). Note that these model extensions are more speculative
than the analysis developed around our focal case (SRI); as such, they require further investigation and
empirical testing, for which we hope our framework could provide a first theoretical basis.
Insert Figure 6

Judgment Silencing . The second path of our model is Judgment Silencing, where a purpose-based
product category, such as Islamic finance, gradually loses its normative anchorage. Islamic finance is often
defined as an “interest-free” financial product that needs to obtain a halal certification by accredited Sharia
scholars to prove the compliance of the mutual fund with the Sharia law (Hayat et al. 2013). Islamic
finance is a complex setting whose intricacies and nuances cannot be faithfully accounted for within the
space of this section. Islam counts more than 1.5 billion followers on the globe, associated with many
different interpretations of the Sharia law. The trajectory of Islamic finance, however, broadly associates
with a movement from judgment inclusion toward judgment silence.
The modern form of Islamic finance arose in 1974, when 44 countries founded the Islamic
Development Bank (IDB). Islamic funds shared a common purpose: to build a financial system that
respected Islam precepts and preserved the destiny of Islamic countries. Islamic finance was a
collaborative purpose-based product category whose definition was grounded in the inclusion of
normative attributes based on the Sharia (i.e., the phase of Judgment Inclusion). Soon afterwards, Islamic
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financiers—governments and private-sector pioneers—created the International Association of Islamic
Bank (1977) and published the Handbook of Islamic Banking, which became the reference for Islamic
institutions. In the following years, initiatives proliferated with a special focus on building the academic
knowledge of Islamic finance and extending Islamic finance to the general public (Warde 2000, p. 77).
However, the transparency of investment practices and the efforts to convince investors of the
soundness of the approach spurred critics. Furthermore, the more individuals looked at the investment
processes, the more questions were raised. As a result, some countries started launching their own Islamic
banking systems with their own rules and systems of certification (Warde 2000, p. 83). By the 1980s and
1990s, the transparency of means and public and private contestation had led to an intense phase of
judgment questioning in the industry, which was regularly nurtured by scandals, such as the collapse of
the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) in 1991. Evaluation criteria varied (including
means and purposes), definitions diverged, and conflicts endured (i.e., the phase of Judgment
Questioning).
Critics are still alive in the Islamic bank sector (see Pitluck (2012) for some discussion of the problems
at stake). Yet, many countries have shifted toward a phase of stability around “judgment silence.” Islamic
finance is gradually loosing its religious rhetoric (Ernst & Young 2011), which is notably the case since
many Islamic finance products are now sold outside the Islamic world, through partnerships between
conventional and Islamic institutions. The two transition conditions “market opportunity” and “identity
muting” progressively lead to the silencing of the normative attributes of the product. Majed Al-Refai,
chief executive of the Bahrain-based First Islamic Investment Bank, explained: “Our aim is to create
credit-rated medium- to long-term investment tools which are comparable with existing conventional
products, so that financial advisors can advise their clients to invest with us on the basis of returns, rather
than because they are Islamic” (cited by Warde 2000, p. 86). In the aftermath of the financial crisis,
Islamic finance has been praised, not for its religious ethics, but for its ability to mitigate risk exposure
(Hasan and Dridi 2011). For an increasing number of observers, Islamic finance has become a
diversification opportunity that everyone interested in making money should embrace (Arouri et al. 2013).
The silencing of its normative attributes hence progressively diffuses, leaving investors with a lenient
product category, whose evaluation is based on means, and whose growth gives market actors little
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interest to voice their concerns (i.e., the phase of Judgment Silence).

Reversion to Silence. The second path of our model is “Reversion to Silence,” during which a phase of
judgment silence is followed by a phase of judgment questioning, yet the product category reverts to
judgment silence. Such a process unfolded in the case of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), which
are financial products that pool cash-flow–generating assets and repackage those assets into tranches. The
pooled assets (i.e., mortgages, bonds, and loans) serve as collateral for the CDOs.
CDOs attracted much criticism in the aftermath of the financial crisis. The International Monetary
Fund estimated in 2008 that half of the $1.4 trillion losses came from structured financial products such
as CDOs (International Monetary Fund 2008). The financial crisis made these investment practices
known and visible (i.e., the first transition condition) and spurred a tide of public and private contestation
(i.e., the second transition condition). Research detailing the mechanisms through which critics arose
from within and outside the investment industry regarding the lack of morals associated with such
investment practices (see Davis 2010, MacKenzie 2011, Pozner et al. 2010 for some reviews). The
product category became an iconic incarnation of the greediness of finance and led to an intense phase of
judgment questioning.
What few individuals know, however, is that CDOs are still being used today. It is estimated that the
sales of synthetic CDOs rose from $20 billion in 2015 to $100 billion in 2017 (Citigroup 2017). Recently,
in a double page titled, “This Time It’s Different—Back to the Future,” Thomson Reuters explained that
banks are “decontaminating the once-ignominious synthetic CDO” (International Financing Review
2018, p. 100). The process of reversion to silence could probably not be clearer. The motivations of
investors are said to be mainly financial. CDOs present high-yield opportunities, and credit derivatives
desks are eager to make profits. The first transition condition “market opportunity” hence certainly
explains most of this reversion, but the second condition “identity muting” also plays a role. MacKenzie
and Spears (2014) showed that designers of CDOs actually questioned to a large extent the models they
created, often considered them as flawed. Yet, modelers kept using the same models, even when
alternatives were available. The main argument put forward by the authors to explain such a paradox is
the complexity to coordinate within the market. The model (i.e., the Gaussian Copula) is actually used by
modelers not because it is statistically accurate, but because it offers market actors with no shared culture

30

a common basis for pricing CDOs. The model is a necessary evil to maintain the market. In other words,
CDO-market actors swept under the carpet their potential discomfort and any questioning about their
instruments and their connection with reality. They stifled their identity differences and maintained the
product in its original form (i.e., our first transition condition “identity muting”). Hence, both conditions
account for the reversion to moral silence of the product category.

Judgment Maintenance. The last path of our framework extension is “Judgment Maintenance” where a
purpose-based product category based on normative attributes is questioned, but maintains its normative
basis. A good example of such a process is the development of life insurance in the 19th century in the
United States (Zelizer 1978). Life insurance first appeared as an answer to the increasing economic
destitution of widows and orphans of low-paid Presbyterian and Episcopalian ministers. The goal was
explicitly altruistic and spurred by religious beliefs. Life insurance thus emerged as a purpose-based
product category, based on normative attributes.
As in the previous cases, the product category soon attracted critics. In particular, the clergy was
divided. One group denounced a “sacrilegious device that competed against God in caring for the welfare
of widows and orphans” (Zelizer 1978, p. 596). The other group, which included religious liberals,
supported the industry, notably for its practical (i.e., financial) considerations. Some reluctance also
emerged among the general public who tended to reject any monetary evaluation of human life and
worried that such contracts would provoke their death. The transparency of the (financial) means
together with the public and private contestation led to a phase of questioning, which hindered the
development of the market during the first part of the 19 th century.
Many cultural factors explain why life insurance gradually became legitimate during the second half of
the 19th century, and notably relate to functional changes in the family, due to urbanization. Of interest
for our framework is that the legitimacy of the life insurance product did not unfold through the silencing
of its moral attributes, but rather through their explicit inclusion in the product category itself. Until the
late 19th century, the life insurance industry indeed avoided any economic terminology and advertised
mainly its moral value, rather than its monetary benefits (Zelizer 1978, p. 600). Even when discussions
around the economic value of life started to appear in the industry in the 20th century, market actors were
quick to transform life insurance into a “secular ritual” (Zelizer 1978, p. 602), not a commodity. Clients
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needed to be reassured that “marketing death served the lofty social purpose of combatting poverty,
thereby reducing crime” (Zelizer 1978, p. 605–606). Without including moral purposes in the definition
of the product category, the market hence could have not developed (i.e., the first transition condition of
Threat to Market).
The second condition, Identity Introspection, also played a role. It was only after insurance companies
introduced personal contact between agents and beneficiaries that sales started to increase. Unlike other
products, life insurance required individuals to reflect on and share their views about death and its
meaning. This identity introspection was facilitated by the work of agents who were urged to “remain
above materialistic concerns, performing their task with the spiritual devotion of a missionary” (Zelizer
1978, p. 607). Through such exchanges, producers and clients maintained the normative basis of the
product category.
The trajectories of SRI, Islamic finance, CDOs, and life insurance show that, depending on
conditions, normative attributes are likely to be silenced, questioned, or included. The fact that the four
products belong to the same industry as SRI provides additional evidence that the transition conditions
matter more to the trajectory than industry-specific characteristics.
All four products belong to the “idea/general” side of the normative map of product categories rather
than the “sensation/particular” side we described earlier, which is more applicable to experiential and
cultural products such as food and other hedonistic products. Discussions around SRI and life insurance
mostly concerned the normative constitution of the category, whereas the conversations that surrounded
Islamic finance and CDOs related more to normative evaluation, since these products were questioned
after a (tacit) agreement on their normative features was first obtained.
Our model would be enriched by further investigation of other settings, in particular along the
sensation/particular axis. To encourage such research, we list below some products that have raised
normative questions when constituted or evaluated, and could be potentially studied through the lens of
our judgment framework. On the normative constitution, tablets and other experiencial products (e.g.
virtual reality) might be good products to examine. Indeed, when the iPad was first launched, audiences
did not understand what a tablet was in practice and were therefore unable to categorize the product
(Watkiss 2013). Artificial intelligence (AI) also raises questioning in its multiple usages (e.g., human
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replacement, intimate functions from conversation, post-death AI mourning, or even sexuality) (Russell
and Norvig 2016). On the normative evaluation side of the map, products such as agri-tourism (Tew and
Barbieri 2012) have sparked debates about the positive versus normative aspects of marketizing culture
and nature. The same perspective applies to inductive teaching for which conventional evaluation has
been said to be limited in its ability to account for the uniqueness of the method (Zhai et al. 2017). We
hope our model (Figures 5 and 6) can offer some analytical guidance for further research.

Implications and Discussion
In this research, we investigated how and why producers (i.e., investment managers) agreed to include
normative attributes in the definition of a financial product category: French SRI funds. After a phase of
judgment silence about the normative attributes of this product category, investment managers entered a
phase of judgment questioning before market actors reached an agreement to include a moral purpose in
the product definition. We identified transition conditions and elucidated three additional paths in
addition to judgment inclusion that together constitute the judgment framework depicted in Figures 5
and 6. This article thus answers recent calls for research to provide a better understanding of the
debatable nature of the definition of product categories (Durand and Thornton 2018, Granqvist and
Ritvala 2015), which are not merely cognitive and strategic representations but also judgment-based
classifications. We believe these findings have important implications for the literature on product
categories and the moral and social underpinnings of markets more broadly.
Product Categories as Judgment Devices
Market actors tend to silence their moral dispositions and beliefs as economies are thought to be valueneutral, objective profit-maximization structures (Fourcade et al. 2013). Our judgment framework (Figure
5) exhibits the paths that lead product categories both to include (or not) more than positive attributes
(physical properties and functionalities) and to encompass normative attributes that point to values and
purposes. Product categories are classification devices that organize markets, certainly; but they are also
judgment devices conveying particular norms and ideals. As such, the attributes of some established
categories can be questioned, as transparency around their practices reveals behaviors and attitudes that
become morally tainted and a subject of public and private contestation. Hence, judging categories’
attributes occurs when categories form and also when they have been in existence for long.
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Furthermore, drawing on a long-established distinction between faculties (first synthetized by Kant’s
(1790) critiques and refined since then), we make central the faculty of judging in market exchanges. Most
commonly, product category research refers to the faculty of knowing, whereby positive attributes lead to
comparison and similarity-based evaluation to identify and assess candidates (Hsu et al. 2009). Another
vein of research explains that audiences recombine attributes and evaluate candidates as a function of
how well this recombination matches their goals and needs (Paolella and Durand 2016). In both
instances, however, the conception of judging is limited to the identification of positive attributes as
acceptable, coherent, and beneficial. By invoking the faculty of judging, we introduce a difference in
nature.
As developed by Kant (1790) and many other social scientists, normative attributes involve a purpose
that, based on specific values, audience members assess a priori as moral (good/bad) or aesthetic
(beautiful/ugly). Normative attributes differ fundamentally from positive attributes, as they engage
different brain functions, mobilize different languages and narratives, and reveal the impossibility of
compensatory trade-offs among features. As the examples developed in the article illustrate, individuals
within and outside organizations struggle to reconcile objective characteristics of the products they have
to sell or they want to buy with their emotional appeal for “doing good”. The faculty of knowing and the
faculty of judging do not function in an “either-or” mode. A similar feature can be subject to both
faculties, which explains why, for some individuals, internal tensions and identity introspection are
generated when the faculty of judging supersedes the faculty of knowing. Such a situation was evidently
the case for financial advisers facing the moral imperative of selling “products good for the planet” (i.e.,
SRI funds), which were actually similar to any other fund. While risk/return narrative is operative in many
finance segments, the narrative around SRI is subtler and reveals inner contradictions and insuperable
tradeoffs in the features and goals of SRI and of any other financial product. The product category
literature has been ignoring the gradual questioning of many products and markets, on the grounds of
their morality. Likewise, scholars interested in the social foundations of markets have not fully
investigated the role of product categories in the normative constitution and evaluation of markets. We
contribute to these literatures by describing and theorizing how a product category’s definition
instantiates actors’ purposes and values, and how changes in attributes represent the expression of
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changes in the motivation of actions. We deduce four paths leading to normative attributes’ inclusion or
exclusion in the definition of product categories (i.e., judgment inclusion, judgment silencing, reversion to
silence, and judgment maintenance; see Figure 6).
The transition conditions revealed by our analysis differ from the conditions that explain why positive
attributes are included (or not) in a category definition. For instance, when positive attributes are
disputed, there is often a need for transparency only among a few professionals and experts, little
presence of public contestation, and far less identity introspection or muting. By analyzing one specific
case of judgment inclusion, our framework helps further our understanding of the mechanisms through
which market actors agree on the “definitional antecedents of value” (Khaire and Wadhwani 2010, p.
1296). Hence, product categories, which have long been considered as the cognitive infrastructures of
markets, also constitute the normative underpinnings of markets. Our three-phase framework makes
explicit its constituents and the transition conditions between them.
The Workings of Purpose-Based Product Categories
Setting a purpose for actors to follow in a product definition constitutes a solution to the absence of
compensatory trade-offs among the multiple dimensions of the product. Whereas it is possible to
arbitrage between positive attributes, normative attributes raise distinct challenges that can find resolution
by defining the category from what it aims to achieve. In our case, social responsibility implies an
indefinite set of features and situations, which prevents market actors from listing them all. When a
normative attribute characterizes a product category, its definition cannot rely on a classic form of
commensuration (Espeland and Stevens 1998). Evaluation schemes of normative attributes imply
projection, reflection, and self-questioning rather than the identification of traits, similarity reasoning, and
conceptual combination, which comprise the basis for traditionally evaluating product categories (Durand
and Boulongne 2017). Envisaging categories as judgment devices encourages producers and audiences to
become conscious of their own purposes and values with respect to products (as in Quattrone 2015,
Reinecke and Ansari 2015). Note also that a purpose-based category contaminates other product
categories by making them appear less valuable and less meaningful to some audiences. While most
product categories strive to simplify the purchasing act, purpose-based product categories render the
purchasing act more complex by acting as questioning devices for producers, third parties, and clients. As
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such, our framework furthers our understanding of why market actors compromise (or not) the
competitive benefits and cognitive efficiency of crisp category definitions carried out by positive
attributes—since the inclusion (or withdrawal) of normative attributes displaces the traditional processes
of identification and evaluation detailed in prior research.
Last, unlike previous research, we propose that defining a product category with normative attributes
enables the maintenance of values in the product category, contrary to what happened in the organic,
recycling, and grass-fed meat and dairy movements (Lee et al. 2017, Lounsbury et al. 2003, Weber et al.
2008). In a purpose-based category, the judgment process is actually essential to the categorization of the
product and the workings of the market (Durand and Thornton, 2018). In the case of SRI, only the
intention incorporated into the product (contributing to a sustainable real economy) distinguishes the
mutual fund from a conventional one. Our article hence suggests that market actors can define and enact
product categories to pursue alternative purposes or other “fictional expectations” (Beckert 2016), such as
solidarity, well-being, or diversity (Hollensbe et al. 2014, Marti and Scherer 2016).
Judgment Framework of Product Categories: Boundary Conditions and Limitations
Before concluding, it is worth mentioning several boundary conditions of this research. First, our study
explores normative attributes in the form of morals, and extension to other normative attributes may
require adjustments. As such, our model can be applied to normative attributes that evoke particular
sensations, such as taste, pleasure, and aesthetics, for which the faculty of judging would estimate, for
instance, loyalty to the original, respect of processes, introduction of creative surprises, and genuineness
of intention. However, since we use this case to elaborate a framework rather than to test specific
hypotheses, its extension will weigh more heavily on future empirical tests.
Second, the economic crisis of 2008 seems to have fueled the questioning phase. In our framework, is
a crisis or an environmental jolt necessary to upend a stable phase (i.e., silencing or inclusion)? We doubt
it. The framework extension indeed shows that jolts are not always present. However, some actors need
to convey new information about the sector, the producers, and the categories. Hence, a boundary
condition consists in the possibility for this information to flow and reach audiences of interest. Likewise,
public contestation between producers and other parties, similar to private contestation within firms and
producer associations, needs to be possible, thereby implying a regime of sufficient free speech or at least
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institutional conditions that are safe enough to allow for the sharing and discussion of discrepant views.
Third, because this research represents a single case study, its generalizability is questionable. There is
indeed an inherent historical embeddedness of categorical meanings (Khaire and Wadhwani 2010, p.
1297). The national context also presents some specificities, notably the visible hand of the French
state—a role of the political sphere pointed to by previous research on the definition of product
categories but so far little studied (a recent exception is Ozcan and Gurses (2017)). In other countries or
industries, other actors may have played the same coordination role. Much work remains to be done to
refine the conditions explaining why some product category definitions will move toward (or away from)
normative attributes, but our model provides the essential building blocks and transition conditions
around which more refined elaborations can unfold. Such findings offer the potential to rethink product
categories not as stabilized devices with a steady meaning and functions but as an inherently dynamic and
contested process that appeals as much to market actors’ faculty of judging as to their faculty of knowing.
Avenues for further research concern the role of multiple actors in such processes, linking the judgment
framework with the literatures on morals, institutional theory, or the sociology of valuation.
Conclusion
Increased questioning of market functioning, including its underpinnings and purposes, is transforming
the roles and responsibilities of producers, and the functions of product categories. When faced with
these changes, scholars need to find new ways of understanding the normative component of markets
and its impact on consumption and society. We believe that this endeavor must be accompanied by
changes in how we perceive and theorize product categories. Presenting a judgment framework of
product category definition is a step in this direction, one we hope more researchers and practitioners will
follow.

37

REFERENCES

Adut A (2005) A theory of scandal: Victorians, homosexuality, and the fall of Oscar Wilde. Am.
J. Sociol. 111(1):213–248.
Anteby M (2013) Manufacturing Morals: The Values of Silence in Business School Education (University
of Chicago Press, Chicago).
Anteby M, Anderson C (2016) Management and Morality/Ethics: The Elusive Corporate
Morals. Wilkinson A, Armstrong SJ, Lounsbury M, eds. Oxf. Handb. Manag. (Oxford
University Press, Oxford, UK), 386–398.
Arjaliès DL (2010) A social movement perspective on finance: How socially responsible
investment mattered. J. Bus. Ethics 92:57–78.
Arjaliès DL, Grant P, Hardie I, MacKenzie D, Svetlova E (2017) Chains of Finance: How Investment
Management is Shaped (Oxford University Press).
Arouri M, Ben Ameur H, Jawadi N, Jawadi F, Louhichi W (2013) Are Islamic finance
innovations enough for investors to escape from a financial downturn? Further evidence
from portfolio simulations. Appl. Econ. 45(24):3412–3420.
Association Française de la Gestion Financière, Forum pour l’Investissement Responsable
(2013) Communiqué de presse: L’ISR adopte une nouvelle définition afin de mieux se faire connaître
des épargnants (Association Française de la Gestion Financière & Forum pour
l’Investissement Responsable).
Bamberger PA, Pratt MG (2010) Moving forward by looking back: Reclaiming unconventional
research contexts and samples in organizational scholarship. Acad. Manage. J. 53(4):665–
671.
Barsalou LW (1991) Deriving categories to achieve goals. Bower GH, ed. Psychol. Learn. Motiv.
Adv. Res. Theory. (Academic Press, San Diego, CA), 1–64.
Battilana J, Dorado S (2010) Building Sustainable Hybrid Organizations: The Case of
Commercial Microfinance Organizations. Acad. Manage. J. 53(6):1419–1440.
Beckert J (2016) Imagined Futures (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA).
Benjamin B (2017) Asset & Wealth Management Insights–Asset Management 2020: Taking
Stock. PWC Lond. UK.
Boltanski L, Thévenot L (2006) On Justification: Economies of Worth (Princeton University Press,
Princeton, NJ).
Brovelli L, Drago X, Molinié E (2013) Responsibilité et performance des organisations: 20 Propositions
pour renforcer la démarche de responsabilité sociale des entreprises (RSE) (Ministère de l’Economie
et des Finances, Ministère du Commerce Exterieur, Ministère de l’Ecologie dy
Développement Durable et de l’Energue, Ministère du Travail, de l’Emploi, de la
Formation Professionelle et du Dialogue Social, Paris, France).
Charmaz K, Belgrave L (2002) Qualitative interviewing and grounded theory analysis. Gubrium
JF, Holstein JA, Marvasti AB, McKinney KD, eds. SAGE Handb. Interview Res. Complex.
Craft. (SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA), 347–367.
Chiles TH, Meyer AD, Hench TJ (2004) Organizational emergence: The origin and
transformation of Branson, Missouri’s musical theaters. Organ. Sci. 15(5):499–519.
Citigroup (2017) Citigroup’s Declaration. Retrieved (February 7, 2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-02/as-credit-booms-citi-sayssynthetic-cdos-may-reach-100-billion.
Creed WED, Dejordy R, Lok J (2010) Being the change: Resolving institutional contradiction
through identity work. Acad. Manage. J. 53(6):1336–1364.
Crifo P, Durand R, Gond JP (2018) Encouraging Investors to Enable Corporate Sustainability
Transitions: The Case of Responsible Investment in France. Unpubl. Work. Pap.
Dacin MT, Dacin PA, Tracey P (2011) Social entrepreneurship: A critique and future directions.
Organ. Sci. 22(5):1203–1213.

38

Davis GF (2010) Not just a mortgage crisis: How finance maimed society. Strateg. Organ. 8(1):75–
82.
Davis GF, Marquis C (2005) Prospects for organization theory in the early twenty-first century:
Institutional fields and mechanisms. Organ. Sci. 16(4):332–343.
De Bakker FG, Den Hond F, King B, Weber K (2013) Social movements, civil society and
corporations: Taking stock and looking ahead. Organ. Stud. 34(5–6):573–593.
DiMaggio P (1987) Classification in art. Am. Sociol. Rev.:440–455.
Durand R, Boulongne R (2017) Advancing research on categories for institutional approaches of
organizations. Greenwood R, Oliver C, Lawrence T, Meyer RE, eds. SAGE Handb.
Organ. Institutionalism. (London: UK), 647–668.
Durand R, Georgallis P (2018) Differential firm commitment to industries supported by social
movement organizations. Organ. Sci. 29(1):154–171.
Durand R, Khaire M (2017) Where do market categories come from and how? Distinguishing
category creation from category emergence. J. Manag. 43(1):87–110.
Durand R, Paolella L (2013) Category stretching: Reorienting research on categories in strategy,
entrepreneurship, and organization theory. J. Manag. Stud. 50(6):1100–1123.
Durand R, Thornton P (2018) Categorizing Institutional Logics, Institutionalizing Categories: A
Review of Two Literatures. Acad. Manag. Ann. 12(2):631–658.
Ernst & Young (2011) Islamic Funds & Investments Report 2011: Achieving Growth in Challenging Times
(Ernst & Young).
Espeland WN, Stevens ML (1998) Commensuration as a Social Process. Hagan J, Cook KS, eds.
Annu. Rev. Sociol. (CA: Annual Reviews, Palo Alto, CA), 313–343.
European Fund and Asset Management Association (2015) Asset Management in Europe: Facts and
Figures (European Fund and Asset Management Association (EFAMA), Brussels,
Belgium).
Fourcade M, Healy K (2007) Moral views of market society. Annu. Rev. Sociol. 33:285–311.
Fourcade M, Steiner P, Streeck W, Woll C (2013) Moral categories in the financial crisis. SocioEcon. Rev. 11(3):601–627.
Garud R, Gehman J, Karnøe P (2010) Categorization by association: Nuclear technology and
emission-free electricity. Res. Sociol. Work 21:51–93.
Giamporcaro S, Gond JP (2016) Calculability as politics in the construction of markets: The case
of socially responsible investment in France. Organ. Stud. 37(4):465–495.
Glynn MA, Lounsbury M (2005) From the Critics’ Corner: Logic Blending, Discursive Change
and Authenticity in a Cultural Production System. J. Manag. Stud. 42(5):1031–1055.
Goldberg A, Hannan MT, Kovács B (2016) What does it mean to span cultural boundaries?
Variety and atypicality in cultural consumption. Am. Sociol. Rev. 81(2):215–241.
Gond JP, Boxenbaum E (2013) The glocalization of responsible investment: Contextualization
work in France and Quebec. J. Bus. Ethics 115(4):707–721.
Granqvist N, Grodal S, Woolley JL (2013) Hedging your bets: Explaining executives’ market
labeling strategies in nanotechnology. Organ. Sci. 24(2):395–413.
Granqvist N, Ritvala T (2015) Beyond prototypes: Drivers of market categorization in functional
foods and nanotechnology. J. Manag. Stud. 53(2):210–237.
Greene J, Haidt J (2002) How (and where) does moral judgment work? Trends Cogn. Sci.
6(12):517–523.
Greene JD, Sommerville RB, Nystrom LE, Darley JM, Cohen JD (2001) An fMRI investigation
of emotional engagement in moral judgment. Science 293(5537):2105–2108.
Hannan MT, Pólos L, Carroll GR (2007) Logics of Organization Theory: Audiences, Codes, and Ecologies
(Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ).
Hasan M, Dridi J (2011) The effects of the global crisis on Islamic and conventional banks: A
comparative study. J. Int. Commer. Econ. Policy 2(02):163–200.

39

Haveman HA, Rao H (1997) Structuring a theory of moral sentiments: Institutional and
organizational coevolution in the early thrift industry. Am. J. Sociol. 102(6):1606–1651.
Hayat R, Den Butter F, Kock U (2013) Halal certification for financial products: A transaction
cost perspective. J. Bus. Ethics 117(3):601–613.
Hiatt SR, Sine WD, Tolbert PS (2009) From Pabst to Pepsi: The deinstitutionalization of social
practices and the creation of entrepreneurial opportunities. Adm. Sci. Q. 54(4):635–667.
Ho K (2009) Liquidated: An Ethnography of Wall Street (Duke University Press, Durham, NC).
Hoffman AJ, Ocasio W (2001) Not all events are attended equally: Toward a middle-range
theory of industry attention to external events. Organ. Sci. 12(4):414–434.
Hollande F (2012) Mon véritable adversaire, c’est le monde de la finance. (Discours du Bouget, 22 Janvier
2012, Bourget, France).
Hollensbe E, Wookey C, Hickey L, George G, Nichols CV (2014) Organizations with purpose.
Acad. Manage. J. 57(5):1227–1234.
Hsu G (2006) Jacks of all trades and masters of none: Audiences’ reactions to spanning genres in
feature film production. Adm. Sci. Q. 51(3):420–450.
Hsu G, Grodal S (2015) Category taken-for-grantedness as a strategic opportunity The case of
light cigarettes, 1964 to 1993. Am. Sociol. Rev. 80(1):28–62.
Hsu G, Hannan MT, Koçak Ö (2009) Multiple category memberships in markets: An integrative
theory and two empirical tests. Am. Sociol. Rev. 74(1):150–169.
Huault I, Rainelli-Weiss H (2011) A market for weather risk? Conflicting metrics, attempts at
compromise, and limits to commensuration. Organ. Stud. 32(10):1395–1419.
International Financing Review (2018) 2017 Review of the Year (Thomson Reuters, London, UK).
International Monetary Fund (2008) Global Financial Stability Report: Financial Stress and
Deleveraging–Macro-financial Implications and Policy (International Monetary Fund,
Washington, DC).
International Monetary Fund (2015) Global Financial Stability Report: Navigating Monetary Policy
Challenges and Managing Risks (International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC).
Jackall R (1988) The World of Corporate Managers (Oxford University Press, New York).
Kant I (1790) The Critique of Judgment (Theory of the Aesthetic Judgment & Theory of the Teleological
Judgment) (e-artnow (ebook published in 2015)).
Karpik L (2010) Valuing the Unique: The Economics of Singularities (Princeton University Press
Princeton).
Khaire M, Wadhwani DR (2010) Changing landscapes: The construction of meaning and value
in a new market category – Modern Indian art. Acad. Manage. J. 53(6):1281–1304.
Knorr-Cetina K, Preda A eds. (2012) The Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of Finance (Oxford
University Press, Oxford, UK).
Kodeih F, Bouchikhi H, Gauthier V (2018) Competing Through Categorization: Product-and
Audience-Centric Strategies in an Evolving Categorical Structure. Organ.
Stud.:0170840618772597.
Label ISR (2016) Le label ISR en résumé–particuliers. Retrieved (December 5, 2016),
http://www.lelabelisr.fr/le-label-isr-en-resume-particuliers.
Langley A (1999) Strategies for theorizing from process data. Acad. Manage. Rev. 24(4):691–710.
Lee BH, Hiatt SR, Lounsbury M (2017) Market mediators and the trade-offs of legitimacyseeking behaviors in a nascent category. Organ. Sci. 28(3):447–470.
Lok J (2010) Institutional logics as identity projects. Acad. Manage. J. 53(6):1305–1335.
Louche C, Lydenberg SD (2006) Investissement socialement responsable: Différences entre
Europe et Etats-Unis. Rev. Econ. Financ. 85:81–105.
Lounsbury M (2001) Institutional source of practice variation: Staffing college and university
recycling programs. Adm. Sci. Quartely 46:29–56.

40

Lounsbury M, Rao H (2004) Sources of durability and change in market classifications: A study
of the reconstitution of product categories in the American mutual fund industry, 19441985. Soc. Forces 82:969–999.
Lounsbury M, Ventresca MJ, Hirsch PM (2003) Social movements, field frames and industry
emergence: A cultural-political perspective on US recycling. Socio-Econ. Rev. 1(1):71–104.
Louvel Y, Rivoalan S (2010) Investissement Socialement Responsable: l’heure du tri. Amis Terre.
Lund S, Daravula T, Dobbs R, Harle P, Kwek JH, Falcon R (2013) Financial globalization: Retreat
or reset? (McKinsey Global Institute, New York).
MacKenzie D (2011) The credit crisis as a problem in the sociology of knowledge. Am. J. Sociol.
116(6):1778–1841.
MacKenzie D, Spears T (2014) “A device for being able to book P&L”: The organizational
embedding of the Gaussian Copula. Soc. Stud. Sci. 44(3):418–440.
Marti E, Scherer A (2016) Financial regulation and social welfare: The critical contribution of
management theory. Acad. Manage. Rev. 41(2):298–323.
Massa FG, Helms WS, Voronov M, Wang L (2017) Emotions uncorked: Inspiring evangelism
for the emerging practice of cool-climate winemaking in Ontario. Acad. Manage. J.
60(2):461–499.
Ministre des Finances et des Comptes Publics (2016) Cahier des charges du label ISR soutenu par les
pouvoirs publics (Ministre des Finances et des Comptes Publics, Paris, France).
Moll J, de Oliveira-Souza R (2007) Moral judgments, emotions and the utilitarian brain. Trends
Cogn. Sci. 11(8):319–321.
Murphy G (2002) The Big Book of Concepts (MIT Press, Boston, MA).
Negro G, Hannan MT, Rao H (2011) Category reinterpretation and defection: Modernism and
tradition in Italian winemaking. Organ. Sci. 22(6):1449–1463.
Novethic (2015) 2014 Figures on Responsible Investment in France (Novethic, Paris, France).
Ortiz H (2014) Valeur financière et vérité: Enquête d’anthropologie politique sur l’évaluation des entreprises
cotées en bourse (Les Presses de SciencesPo).
Ozcan P, Gurses K (2017) Playing cat and mouse: Contests over regulatory categorization of
dietary supplements in the US. Acad. Manage. J. ePub ahead of print February 20,
https://journals.aom.org/doi/abs/10.5465/amj.2015.1221.
Paolella L, Durand R (2016) Category spanning, evaluation, and performance: Revised theory
and test on the corporate law market. Acad. Manage. J. 59(1):330–351.
Phillips DJ, Turco CJ, Zuckerman EW (2013) Betrayal as market barrier: Identity-based limits to
diversification among high-status corporate law firms. Am. J. Sociol. 118(4):1023–1054.
Pitluck AZ (2012) Islamic banking and finance: Alternative or façade? Cetina KK, Preda A, eds.
Oxf. Handb. Sociol. Finance. (Oxford University Press Oxford, Oxford, UK), 431–449.
Pontikes EG (2012) Two sides of the same coin: How ambiguous classification affects multiple
audiences’ evaluations. Adm. Sci. Q. 57(1):81–118.
Pontikes EG, Barnett WP (2015) The persistence of lenient market categories. Organ. Sci.
26(5):1415–1431.
Pozner JE, Stimmler MK, Hirsch PM (2010) Terminal isomorphism and the self-destructive
potential of success: Lessons from subprime mortgage origination and securitization. Res.
Sociol. Organ. 30(A):183–216.
Quattrone P (2015) Governing social orders, unfolding rationality, and Jesuit accounting
practices: A procedural approach to institutional logics. Adm. Sci. Q. 60(3):411–445.
Rao H, Monin P, Durand R (2003) Institutional change in toque ville: Nouvelle cuisine as an
identity movement in French gastronomy. Am. J. Sociol. 108(4):795–843.
Reinecke J, Ansari S (2015) What is a “fair” price? Ethics as sensemaking. Organ. Sci. 26(3):867–
888.
Russell SJ, Norvig P (2016) Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (Malaysia; Pearson Education
Limited).

41

Sapin M (2014) Place de Paris 2020 – La finance au service de l’économie – Réunion du Comité du 1er
décembre 2014 (Ministre des Finances et des Comptes Publics, Paris, France).
Sapin M (2015) Lancement du label “Investissement socialement responsable” soutenu par les pouvoirs publics,
Déclaration du 28 Septembre 2015 (Ministre des Finances et des Comptes Publics, Paris,
France).
Schneiberg M, Berk G (2010) From categorical imperative to learning by categories: Cost
accounting and new categorical practices in American manufacturing, 1900–1930. Hsu
G, Negro G, Koçak Ö, eds. Categ. Mark. Orig. Evol. Res. Sociol. Organ. Vol. 31. (Emerald
Publishing Limited, Binlgey, UK), 255–292.
Smith A (1759) The theory of moral sentiments, ed. DD Raphael AL Macfie Lib. FundOriginal
Work Publ. 1759ELK.
Strauss A, Corbin J (1998) Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing
Grounded Theory Second. (Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA).
Suarez FF, Grodal S, Gotsopoulos A (2015) Perfect timing? Dominant category, dominant
design, and the window of opportunity for firm entry. Strateg. Manag. J. 36(3):437–448.
Tew C, Barbieri C (2012) The perceived benefits of agritourism: The provider’s perspective.
Tour. Manag. 33(1):215–224.
TheCityUK (2014) Fund Management 2013.
Vergne JP, Swain G (2017) Categorical anarchy in the UK? The British media’s classification of
bitcoin and the limits of categorization. Durand R, Granqvist N, Tyllström A, eds. Categ.
Categ. Stud. Sociol. Organ. Strategy Crossroads Res. Sociol. Organ. Vol. 51. (Emerald Publishing
Limited, Bingley, UK), 185–222.
Vergne JP, Wry T (2014) Categorizing categorization research: Review, integration and future
directions. J. Manag. Stud. 51(1):56–94.
Voronov M, De Clercq D, Hinings C (2013) Institutional complexity and logic engagement: An
investigation of Ontario fine wine. Hum. Relat. 66(12):1563–1596.
Warde I (2000) Islamic Finance in the Global Economy (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh,
UK).
Watkiss L (2013) New technology as equivoque: Time and experience in sensemaking and
sensegiving about Apple’s iPad. (Academy of Management Proceedings), 10342.
Weber K, Heinze KL, DeSoucey M (2008) Forage for thought: Mobilizing codes in the
movement for grass-fed meat and dairy products. Adm. Sci. Q. 53(3):529–567.
Yan S, Ferraro F, Almandoz J (2018) The rise of socially responsible investment funds: The
paradoxical role of the financial logic. Adm. Sci. Q.:0001839218773324.
Yin RK (2013) Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Sage Publications, Thousand Oakes, CA).
Zelizer VA (1978) Human values and the market: The case of life insurance and death in 19thcentury America. Am. J. Sociol. 84(3):591–610.
Zhai X, Gu J, Liu H, Liang JC, Chin-Chung T (2017) An experiential learning perspective on
students’ satisfaction model in a flipped classroom context. J. Educ. Technol. Soc.
20(1):198.
Zuckerman EW (2017) The categorical imperative revisited: Implications of categorization as a
theoretical tool. Durand R, Granqvist N, Tyllström A, eds. Categ. Categ. Stud. Sociol. Organ.
Strategy Crossroads Res. Sociol. Organ. Vol. 51. (Emerald Publishing Limited, Bingley, UK),
31–68.

42

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1.

Evolution of French SRI Assets, 2003–2015 (€ billion) (Source: Novethic)
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Note. SRI = Socially Responsible Investment; Novethic counts all funds that label themselves SRI; figures adjusted in
2015 due to a change in Novethic’s methodology.

Figure 2.

Data Structure

Note. SRI = socially responsible investment.
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Figure 3. Timeline of Events in Defining the SRI Product Category, 1997–2015

Notes. SRI = socially responsible investment; ESG = environmental, social, and governance; AFNOR =
Association Française de Normalisation, or French Association of Normalization.

Figure 4. Percentage of Novethic SRI-labeled Mutual Funds, 2009–2014

Note. SRI = socially responsible investment. In 2014, the number of SRI funds was estimated to be 409 out of a total
of 2,875 funds managed by 67 asset management companies, meaning that SRI funds represented 14.2% of the total
number of French mutual funds (source: AFG and AMF).
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Figure 5. Judgment Framework of the Product Category Definition

Figure 6. Different Paths of Judgment Framing

Notes. SRI = socially responsible investment; CDOs = collaterized debt obligations.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1. Details of Interviews
Organization
Asset Management Companies
Asset Management Company A
Asset Management Company B
Asset Management Company C
Asset Management Company D
Asset Management Company D
Asset Management Company D
Asset Management Company E
Asset Management Company F
Asset Management Company G
Asset Management Company H
Asset Management Company I
Asset Management Company J
Asset Management Company K
Asset Management Company M
Asset Management Company M
Asset Management Company M
Asset Management Company N
Asset Management Company O
Asset Management Company P
Public Authorities
French Financial Authorities (AMF)
Ministry of Ecology, Sustainable
Development and Energy
Ministry for Finance and Economy
Potential Users of SRI Labels
Insurance Company A
Insurance Company A
Insurance Company B
Insurance Company DB
Bank A
Bank B
Bank C
Bank D
Bank E
Bank F
Utility Company
Savings Retirement Fund B
Savings Retirement Fund C

Function

Number of Interviews
2006–
2010–
20152009
2014
2017

Head of SRI
Head of SRI
Head of SRI
SRI Analyst
CEO & Head of SRI
Head of SRI
Head of European Fund
Distribution & CEO France
Head of SRI & 2 SRI
Analysts
Head of SRI
Head of SRI
Head of SRI
Head of SRI
Head of SRI
Head of SRI Research
Head of SRI
Head of SRI Promotion
Head of SRI
Head of Research
CEO & Head of SRI

1
1
1
1
1
0
1

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
1
0
1
0

0

1

0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
1
1
1

Project Managers
responsible for writing the
AMF report on SRI (2)
Project Officers,
Sustainable Finance (3) &
Senior Advisor,
Responsible Finance
Deputy Head of Savings
and Financial Markets

0

0

1

0

0

1

0

0

1

CSR Group & Project
Manager
CSR France & Project
Manager
Head of Corporate CSR
Project Manager
Head of Corporate CSR
Project Manager
CSR Deputy Director
CSR Project Manager
Director of Development
for Regional Banks
Financial Adviser
Employee Savings Funds
Manager
Trustee
Head of Responsible
Investment

1

0

0

1

0

0

1
1
1
1
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
1
1
1

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0

0
1

1
0

0
0

1
1

0
0
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Organization

Function

Savings Retirement Fund D
Savings Retirement Fund A
Savings Retirement Fund A
Consulting Firm A
Consulting Firm B
Consulting Firm C
Consulting Firm D
Savings Retirement Fund Board
Members’ Association

Trustees
Head of Equity and SRI
Trustee
Senior Consultant
Partner
Senior Consultant
Consultant
Trustee

Rating Agencies
Broker A
Broker B
Broker B
Social Rating Agency A
Social Rating Agency B
Social Rating Agency C
Social Rating Agency D
Social Rating Agency E
Certification Bodies
Novethic
Certification Body A
AFNOR
AFNOR
CIES Trade Union A (certification
body for employee savings funds)
CIES Trade Union B
CIES Trade Unions
Finansol (certification body for
profit-sharing funds)
Industry Representatives
FrenchSIF (French lobby for SRI)
FrenchSIF
Eurosif (European lobby for SRI)
AFG (French Professional
Association of Asset Management)
AFG
AFG
AFG
AFG
Representatives of Civil Society
NGO A specialized in SRI
NGO B specialized in Finance
Friends of the Earth
Movie & Debate “I, Finance and
Sustainable Development”

Number of Interviews
2006–
2010–
20152009
2014
2017
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
2

Head of SRI Research
Head of SRI Research
Head of SRI Research &
SRI Analyst
Head of Research
Head of Research
Head of Research
Head of Research
Senior Client Relationship
Manager

1
1
1

0
0
0

0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1

1
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0

Responsible for the SRI
label
Responsible for the SRI
label project (abandoned)
Senior Project Manager,
ISO 26000 (CSR
certification)
Senior Project Manager,
SRI Certification
Members (3)

0

2

1

0

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

1

1

0

Members (2)
Members (3)
Director

1
0
0

0
1
0

0
0
1

Vice-President and
Secretary General
Secretary General
Head of Research
Head of Research

0

1

0

1
0
1

1
1
0

2
0
0

Chief Executive Officer
Head of SRI Research
Head of Research & SRI
Project Manager
Responsible for SRI (2)

1
0
0

0
1
2

0
0
0

0

1

1

Head of SRI Research
Project Manager
Responsible for SRI
Movie Director

1
1
0
0

0
0
1
1

0
0
1
0
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Organization

Function

Alternative Finance Network
Finance Watch
Finance Watch
Think Tank A specialized in SRI
NGO C specialized in Finance
NGO D specialized in Environment
NGO E specialized in Environment

Director
Head of Communications
Secretary General
Project Manager
France Campaigner
President
Scientific Director

TOTAL

Number of Interviews
2006–
2010–
20152009
2014
2017
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
33

36

27

Note. SRI = socially responsible investment; AMF = Autorité des marchés financiers, or financial markets regulator;

ESG = environmental, social, and governance; CSR = corporate social responsibility; AFNOR = Association
Française de Normalisation, or French Association of Normalization; CIES = Comité Intersyndical de l’Epargne
Salariale or inter trade unions committee for employee saving funds; FrenchSIF = French Sustainable Investment
Forum, or Forum pour l’Investissement Responsable (FIR); AFG = Association Française de la Gestion Financière,
or French professional association of asset management; NGO = non-governmental organization. The types of
stakeholders interviewed varied over the years, due to the changes in the definition process. For instance, rating
agencies were initially expected to play a key role in the definition of SRI but later appeared to be not involved in the
discussion. Likewise, the envisioned potential users of the SRI label evolved over time.
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Appendix 2. Expected Features of the French Public SRI Mutual Funds According to Each Organization (Source: Institutional Documents)
AFG-FrenchSIF
Transparency Code
(Industry Representatives)
2005
I – General information
The signatories must
disclose precise
information about the state
of the company and the
funds.
II – ESG information
criteria
The signatories must be
clear on the goal pursued
by the fund and its ESG
investment criteria.
III – ESG analysis process
The signatories commit to
disclosing clear
information on the ESG
analysis process for their
investments.
IV – Evaluation, selection
and investment policy
The signatories commit to
disclosing information on
how the ESG analysis is
used to construct and
manage their portfolios.
IV – Engagement policy
The signatories must
explain their engagement
policy if the fund has one.
V – Voting policy
The signatories commit to
being clear regarding their
voting policy.

Novethic SRI Label
(with moral attributes)
2012
I – Integration of ESG analysis
- At least 90% of issuers must be
evaluated on the three dimensions
of ESG.
- The SRI exclusion rate of issuers
should be at least 15%.
- The global ESG quality of the
portfolio must be comparable to
other SRI funds.
II – Transparency of the process
- The asset manager must comply
with the Transparency Code
- The answer to the transparency
code should include updated
information on the means and the
selection steps of ESG values.
- The investment policy must
explicitly mention the exclusion of
manufacturers of weapons such as
mines and cluster bombs.
III – Non-financial reporting
- ESG reports should include
quantitative data on the ESG
features of the fund and the
exclusion rate of the SRI process,
and be published at least quarterly.
IV – Publication of the portfolio
- The portfolio must be published at
least once every 6 months and
must show the real issuers (not the
parent company or another
analyzed entity); the names of
issuers must be easily identifiable.

AFNOR
(National
Certification Body)
2013
The company
commits itself to:
- Analyzing the
defined ESG
criteria with
competence and
impartiality;
- Updating and
ensuring the
accuracy of the
ratings on a
regular basis;
- Constructing
portfolios by
respecting the
rigorous SRI
rules;
- Permanently
and independently
controlling
respect for the
SRI management
rules;
- Dialoguing and
voting in favor of
a progress-making
approach;
- Informing
clients with full
transparency; and
- Continuously
improving
practices.

French State-Backed SRI Label

AMF Report on SRI
(French Financial Authorities)

September 2015
I – Goals pursued by the fund through the implementation of
ESG criteria for the issuers
General, financial and ESG-specific goals that are pursued by
integrating ESG criteria into the investment policy are clearly
defined in the commercial documents created for investors.
II – Methodology of analysis and rating of issuers implemented
by the asset management company
i) The ESG evaluation method is clearly described and the asset
management company of the fund demonstrates its ability to
take these criteria into account in its investment policy.
ii) The asset management company of the fund implements
internal or external reliable means to make its analysis and
demonstrates a real effort to analyze and comprehend the
information at its disposal (for at least 90% of issuers).
III – Implementation of ESG criteria into the construction and
life of the portfolio
i) The ESG strategy is explicitly defined and the result of the
implementation of this strategy is measured.
ii) The management of the fund follows a long-term strategy; the
use of derivative products is compatible with the goals of the
fund and congruent with its long-term perspective.
IV – ESG engagement policy (dialogue and voting) with issuers
The general voting policy and the implementation means are
congruent with the goals of the fund.
V – Reinforced transparency
i) Formal communication with distributors and investors is
implemented to guarantee that they understand the strategy and
the goals of the fund.
ii) Respect for SRI management rules is internally controlled and
clearly explained to investors.
VI – The demonstration of positive impacts on the development
of a sustainable economy
- ESG impact on the selected issuers is monitored.

November 2015
- Asset management companies should
maintain cohesiveness between the
different available sources of
information, particularly across
commercial and legal documents and in
the Transparency Code.
Legal and commercial documents
associated with SRI mutual funds should
include:
- a managerial goal with non-financial
dimensions;
- the type(s) of SRI adopted; and
- elements regarding the selection and
management methods used.
- Any fund that is commercialized in
France and wants to emphasize its SRI
characteristic should publish a document
that explains its approach, which follows
the model of the Transparency Code, or
adopt a charter, code, or label that relates
to the integration of criteria that deal
with ESG goals.
- If the asset management company
adopts a shareholder engagement policy,
it should indicate where to find the
documents that enable a better
understanding of these dimensions
(proxy voting and dialogue).
- Non-financial reports (integrated or
not into standard financial reports)
should be easily accessible on the
Internet pages dedicated to SRI funds
and updated at least annually.

Notes. SRI = socially responsible investment; AFG = Association Française de la Gestion Financière, or French professional association of asset management; FrenchSIF = French Sustainable
Investment Forum, or Forum pour l’Investissement Responsable (FIR); AFNOR = Association Française de Normalisation, or French Association of Normalization; AMF = Autorité des marchés
financiers, or financial markets regulator, ESG = environmental, social, and governance.
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